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EXPLAINING THE SIZE OF INFORMAL SECTOR: 
THE ROLE OF TRUST, CORRUPTION AND BUREAUCRATIC QUALITY 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Previously, studies on informal sector were under the monopoly of economists. The 
determinants of informality were set by economic criteria such as cost of registering a 
business, tax rates and GNP per capita. Lately, it has been discovered that in most of the 
developed world, the tax rates are significantly higher than in the developing world, but the 
informal sector size is considerably lower. This fact points out to the unexplored aspects of 
informality such as bureaucratic quality and corruption. What matters most is the quality of 
rules and procedures and the strictness of enforcement and punishment for the violators. On 
top of this, we have to add the psychological aspects of informality such as low confidence 
in state institutions. Just as in the case of psychological aspect of inflation inertia, 
informality can be a by-product of low levels of belief in the necessity of paying one's 
taxes. 
 
In this work, a regression equation was created to test the impact of certain variables 
on the size of informality. Corruption and bureaucratic quality were included to measure 
the effect of an impartial bureaucracy on informality while confidence in state institutions 
variable was used to see if there is any psychological determinant of informal sector. 
Variables such as GNP per capita Cost to Register a Business, Overall Tax Burden and 
Employment Laws Index were the control variables which economists mostly mention as 
the underlying reason for informality. 
 
The results of the regression equation showed that the combined variable of 
corruption and bureaucratic quality is the single most important determinant of informality, 
while confidence does not have much influence on the size of informal sector. Another 
important finding of the quantitative analysis was the confirmation of the fact that high 
taxes do not mean large informal sector. 
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KAYITDII EKONOMY AÇIKLAMAK: 
 GÜVEN, YOLSUZLUK VE BÜROKRATK KALTENN ROLÜ 
 
ÖNSÖZ 
 
Önceleri kayıtdıı sektör ile ilgili aratırmalar genellikle ekonomicilerin tekelindeydi. 
Ekonomik kriterlerle seçilmi- bir iletmeyi kaydetme maliyeti, vergi oranları, kii baına 
düen GSYM gibi- deikenler kayıtdıılıın asıl nedenleri arasında sayılırdı. Son 
zamanlarda yapılan aratırmalar en azından tablonun tamamen böyle olmadıını, gelimi 
ülkelerdeki vergi oranları genellikle gelimekte olan ülkelerden çok daha fazla olmasına 
ramen kayıtdıılıın onlara nazaran çok daha düük olduunu gösteriyor.Bu buluntu bize 
yolsuzluk ve bürokratik kalitenin etkileri gibi kayıtdıılıın hala kefedilmemi birçok yönü 
olduunu gösteriyor. Gözüken o ki kuralların ve prosedürlerin kalitesi ve uygulamanın ve 
cezalandırma sisteminin güvenirlii çok daha belirleyici. Bunun üzerine devlet kurumlarına 
olan güven gibi psikolojik faktörlerin de eklenmesi gerekli. Yapıkan enflasyonun 
psikolojik yönleri olduu gibi devlete olan güvenin azlıı da insanları vergilerini 
ödememeye yönlendiriyor olabilir.  
 
Bu çalımada çeitli baımsız deikenlerin kayıtdıılık üzerindeki etkilerini 
incelemek için bir regresyon denklemi kullanıldı. Yolsuzluk ve bürokratik kalite, 
bürokratik tarafsızlıın kayıtdıılık üzerindeki etkilerini ölçmek için kullanıldı. Devlet 
kurumlarına olan güven ise kayıtdıılıın herhangibir psikolojik boyutu olup olamayacaını 
örenmek için kullanıldı. Kii baına düen GSMH, bir iletmeyi kaydetme maliyeti, Genel 
Vergi Yükü ve Çalıma Yasaları Endeksi gibi deikenler ekonomistlerin çou zaman 
kayıtdıılıın ana sebebi olarak gösterdii bazı makroekonomik verileri kontrol 
deikenleri olarak çalımaya dahil etme çabasının ürünüdür.  
 
Regresyon analizinin sonuçları yolsuzluk ve bürokratik kaliteden oluan kombine 
deikenimizin kayıtdıı sektörün büyüklüünü ölçmede en önemli faktör olduunu, güven 
faktörünün ise belirleyici olmadıını ortaya koydu. Bir dier buluntu ise yüksek vergi 
oranlarının büyük kayıtdıı sektör anlamına gelmediinin bir kez daha kanıtlanmı 
olmasıydı. 
 
Anahtar kelimeler: güven, yolsuzluk, bürokratik kalite, kayıtdıı sektör, bürokrasi, 
regresyon 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The starting point of this study is the following question: Why do some countries 
have larger informal sectors than the others? Is it due to low levels of tax-morale triggered 
by low levels of confidence in state, or is it a side-affect of an incompetent bureaucracy 
with high levels of corruption? This is an important question to address when one tries to 
understand the policy-wise manipulable variables which determine the size of informality 
across countries. While bureaucratic performance might be a policy variable in the short 
run, confidence in state institutions change only in the mid to long run.  
In this study I concentrate on whether confidence in state institutions makes a 
significant difference on the size of informal sector across countries. Keeping the question 
as simple as possible within a single equation framework I will test whether corruption, 
macroeconomic and policy indicators, as well as institutional confidence, are statistically 
significant in determining the size of informality.  
It has usually been the sociologists and economists who made research on informal 
sector. Sociologists are mainly interested in issues such as re-causalization and re-
ethnification of work, social networks, ties of ethnicity and religion that are embedded in 
informal activity and gender, child labor angle of informality. The re-emergence of waged 
homework (or putting out) is a context to question the exploitation of female labor. The re-
emergence of sweat-shops where the laborer is deprived of even the most basic workplace 
security coupled with the absence of social security payments is a case to prove the 
disenfranchisement of workers rights. The prevalence of ethnic, regional and religious ties 
 2 
among the groups operating in the gray, is a context to debate on 'embeddedness' of 
economic activity in networks of solidarity which provides the members of a group certain 
privileges such as the provision of start-up capital for establishing an enterprise, 
employment for a new immigrant who does not have much chance to find a job in the 
formal sector and even private protection for informal activity by the members of the same 
community (such as mafia). Such networks are also necessary for the smooth functioning 
of the informal business activity.  
Economists in general and developmental theorists in particular are interested in the 
growth potential of informality. Well-meaning development experts believe that informal 
companies themselves will grow and eventually join the formal economy if they are given 
credit and other types of technical assistance, hence the popular "micro-credit" programs of 
recent years.1 Others believe, that due to size limitations and low productivity of informal 
firms, they can never make the expected economic contribution to national economies. 
The reaction of policy makers to informality has been largely characterized by 
ignorance if not outright support. Governments frequently view it as a social issue and fail 
to understand its damaging effect on productivity and economic growth. The informal 
economy, they believe, creates jobs for unskilled workers and relieves urban employment 
tensions.  
With the same narrow-mindedness, when it comes to fighting with informality, 
economic austerity measures are the only solutions that come to policy makers’ minds. A 
reduction in social security contributions, direct taxes and the value added taxes coupled 
with a shrinkage of bureaucratic regulations will surely mean that the costs of staying 
formal is lower. Yet, if everything could be explained in numbers, the size of the shadow 
economy across countries should have been strictly in proportion to the taxes demanded by 
their respective states. But this is not the case. Most Scandinavian countries have higher tax 
rates and a very strictly applied regulatory mechanism in comparison to many developing 
                                                 
1
 McKinsey Quarterly “Hidden dangers of Informal Economy” 2004, July No:3 at 
www.mckinseyquarterly.com  
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countries, yet their shadow economies are smaller than many. In addition, there is no 
evidence that the cuts in direct and indirect tax rates will be precisely matched by an 
increase in tax revenue. The cuts in tax rates can make the same effect as that of tax 
amnesties. The non-payers may come to believe that their noncompliance will either be 
responded with an amnesty or a reduction in tax rates. This may even remind responsible 
citizens of their too much 'good will' towards the state and hence further reduce the tax-
paying citizenry. This means that the fight with informality should involve something more 
than economic austerity measures. The measures employed and the tactics used in this 
ambitious project should first and foremost be based on an understanding of political 
psychology of informal players and tax-payers.  
What explains the ease with which citizens evade taxes? What explains their 
recalcitrant attitude towards intervention of state into their economic activities? Some 
scholars argue that staying informal has more to do with trust in state. Without revealing 
the sources of distrust towards the state reflected in the decreasing levels of tax- morale, 
there is no way of fighting with informality. If citizens do not believe either in the capacity 
or the good will of the state to use resources for the common good, they will not pay taxes. 
One reason for the distrust in state could be that the officials and politicians whom people 
associate with the state are believed to be corrupt. An increase in perceptions about 
corruption breeds higher distrust in state.  
A competing point of view about informality is that as long as you achieve a high 
bureaucratic quality characterized by strict enforcement such free rider cases will be kept at 
a minimum. The cure lays less in creating trust in state than in looking tough. People 
engage in informal activity because they are allowed to. Especially when those institutions 
that are supposed to guide and regulate the economic activities of the citizens, are 
themselves prone to corruption, there is no way of blaming the citizens for being 
distrustful. They just adapt themselves into this web of rulelessness.  
I will in this thesis rely on the findings of World Values Survey, in terms of 
calculating trust in state institutions. Perceptions of corruption will be estimated by 
Corruption Perceptions Index of Transparency International. I will rely on the findings of 
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Schneider (2002) for measuring informality across countries. Data on many other 
macroeconomic indicators such as overall tax rates (or overall fiscal burden), employment 
laws, cost to register a business and GNP per capita will be borrowed from reliable think 
tanks and nongovernmental organizations such as Heritage Foundation, Political Risk 
Group and World Bank. A multiple regression model will be utilized to test the significance 
of each variable. 
The cross cultural nature of the study will illustrate if there are any universal patterns 
in terms of the link between trust, corruption, bureaucratic quality and informality. The 
findings of the work may be useful to policy makers in the sense that it will reveal the 
starting point for a well-designed policy to deal with and if desired eradicate informality. 
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CHAPTER 2:  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
Informal sector has constituted an important question in the development studies 
starting with 1950s. After the decolonization of the developing world, the rapid social 
transformation that these countries lived through triggered mass migrations from rural to 
urban settings. The newcomers to cities were mainly motivated by a desire to acquire a job 
and earn a decent living. Further analysis of the situation revealed that this labor transfer 
from rural to urban working sites did not result in the immediate absorption of these 
immigrants into the modern sectors.2 First, the newcomers had to acquire experience in the 
informal sector. Most of the time the immigrants ended up accepting low-paid and low-
skilled jobs without any form of social security such as street vendoring.  
For a long time, it was largely believed that informal sector was a specific feature of 
the developing world. Informal sector was a phenomenon related with underdevelopment 
and incomplete industrialization (Bulutay, 1998). It was an anomaly that had to be 
remedied with complete modernization of the economy and institutionalization of the 
workers' rights. The sweat-shops and the practice of putting-out were a distant memory for 
the advanced capitalist countries. Not only did they legalize trade union activism and 
workers' rights as a counterbalancing mechanism for the drawbacks of industrial revolution, 
they also achieved the institutionalization of 'the paying of taxes' as one of the founding 
                                                 
2
 I use the term modern sectors meaning relatively well-paid sectors which also provide the 
worker with a certain social security service. 
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principles of their state-building efforts. The 1950s, when the economists were making 
these comparisons between advanced capitalist countries and the developing world, also 
coincided with Keynesian welfare policies of the West where the working population were 
protected with lavish social security services. These were the times when even the most 
liberal economies of the world, such as USA, were making a ‘New Deal’ for their workers.  
In such an atmosphere, the development studies which were heavily influenced by 
modernization school at the time put forward the idea that as the developing world adopted 
Western ways of economic growth and industrialization, all the labor force coming from 
the rural settings would eventually be absorbed by the modern urban sectors. There was a 
belief at the time about the developing world that economic modernization would 
eventually eradicate such low-paid low-skilled informal jobs, as small and medium sized 
firms gave way to big conglomerates organized along Fordist lines. Development experts 
believed that informal companies would grow and eventually join the formal economy if 
they were given credit and other types of technical assistance hence the popular "micro-
credit" programs of recent years. It was also believed that the economic modernization 
would transform these informal workers into organized labor. Informal sector workers were 
mainly portrayed as 'peasants in the city' without any ideological orientation or affinity with 
a political party. By the time they acquired any political preference they would have 
become part of the formal and organized labor force (Sanyal, 1991).  
When we came to 1970s, the findings pointed out to the fact that informal sector was 
neither marginal nor transitional and that informal workers were far from being a 'working 
class in embryo' (Sanyal, 1991).3 The pace and the structure of industrialization in the 
developing world could absorb only a portion of the informal labor force. What is more 
striking is the fact that even in the advanced capitalist world we witness a trend of 
informalization as the metropolises of these rich countries attract massive numbers of 
immigrants who can only depend on such low-skilled, low-paid jobs provided for them in 
                                                 
3
 The World Bank estimates that this informal economy generates 40 percent of the GNP of 
low-income nations and 17 percent of the GNP of high-income ones. In some industries, 
such as retailing and construction, informality can account for as much as 80 percent of 
employment. Source: McKinsey Quarterly, July 2004, no: 3.  
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their ethnic neighborhoods. The literature on economic sociology of immigration is 
growing in the developed world due to the influx of massive numbers of immigrants to 
these countries. Most of the time immigrants operate informally since they are discouraged 
from jobs in the modern sectors of their host country.  
Informal sector is serving an important function which is providing the subsistence 
wage for the survival of the urban poor both in the developed and the developing world. 
Keith Hart (1973) was the first person to coin the term “informal sector” and propose that 
informal sector constituted a complex, organized and dynamic portion of the urban 
economy, especially in the developing world and in the immigrant communities in the 
advanced capitalist countries. In line with this argument, International Labor Organization 
(ILO) with its Kenya Report popularized the concept by proposing that the acute 
unemployment problem and the social consequences such as mass starvation and rebellion 
that accompanied it could only be overcome with the existence of a vibrant informal sector 
that provides the urban poor with the basic survival mechanism (PREALC 1981). 
Promoting informality was both for unemployment reduction and a fight against poverty. A 
transition from the belief that informality will disappear with industrialization to a belief in 
the permanence and usefulness of informality took place. 
When social scientists began to realize that informal sector was a permanent feature 
of both the developing and the developed world, they began to question what caused its 
genesis and permanence. With the revival of neo-liberal doctrines in 1980s, it was assumed 
by neo-liberal economists that informal sector was an outcome of an overregulated 
economy with unreasonable tax rates pushing firms into informality. Theoreticians such as 
De Soto (1989) proposed that informal sector represents the entrepreneurial side of 
developing countries carrying big potentials to become the locomotives of their native 
economies in the future. This was a clear deviation from the earlier belief that informal 
sector had no significant contribution to economic growth.4 The revival of neo-liberal 
doctrines reanimated the old discourse of laissez-faire, this time to the benefit of informal 
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 The reason for such a stance was that informality necessitated staying small and this 
smallness syndrome meant a limitation on economies of scale. 
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sector players. The neo-liberals advocated the relaxation of state's regulatory role over 
small and medium sized enterprises and the promotion of informal sector in the name of 
promoting entrepreneurship and economic growth. Maldonado sums up this argument as 
follows: 
“…on this supposition legal instruments are the main influence-outweighing 
economic, social and cultural factors- on the emergence and survival of the informal sector, 
because of a restrictive, off-putting administrative and legal framework. Lengthy legislation 
procedures, complex administrative steps and the costs involved in legalizing an enterprise 
combine to deter enterprises from operating legally” (Maldonado, 1995:5). 
For many economists, increasing informality is a reaction given to the politicization 
of economic activity. The exercise of control rights such as regulatory powers over 
privatized firms, the ability to regulate and restrict entry, control over the use of land that 
private businesses occupy, the determination and collection of taxes, the right to inspect 
firms and close them if the regulations are violated, is a clear distraction for business 
activity (Johnson, Kaufmann and Lobaton, 1998:3). Especially in the developing world, 
where the transparency and accountability principles are not instituted at all, many of these 
control rights are used for the private enrichment of state officials by interfering into 
economic decisions when their interests are concerned. When entrepreneurs become aware 
of the fact that their profits are taken away through regulation, taxation or corruption, they 
choose to operate unofficially.  
But such neo-liberal propositions are also flawed. For example, Europe with a fair 
amount of regulation does not experience as much informality as it is experienced in the 
developing world (Portes and Schauffler, 1993:47). The experiences that Russia lived 
through also contradict neo-liberal arguments. Laissez-faire advocates were arguing that 
too much regulation causes informality. The Soviet second economy-as it was called in 
place of informal sector- was a proof of this proposition. As has been noted by Kosals 
(1991) there was a widespread opinion during the Gorbachev era that shadow economy was 
the result of highly bureaucratized Soviet system that could only be eliminated by 
liberalization and a transition to market economy. To the extent that the country was 
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integrated to capitalism the shadow economy would diminish. Yet, just the opposite 
happened. Today, illegal activities constitute a significant portion of Russian economy. The 
problem with economic liberalization in countries like Russia is that, in those areas where 
freedoms are formally permitted, guarantees and protection on the part of the state are 
lacking. As the rules of the game are lacking, the population and business people tried to 
enter into primarily unofficial relations with bureaucrats not representative of the state and 
its formal rules but rather as private individuals who can offer services at a certain price. 
This is a direct result of the drastic privatization of the economic activities of the public 
sector and a sharp decrease in the authoritative powers of the state in the economy. In the 
Russian case, as the rapid economic liberalization increases the uncertainty regarding the 
roles, functions and rights of state bureaucrats, they, as people, possessing the most 
significant business experience during the Soviet era effectively privatized their jobs. As a 
result of this, when an entrepreneur turns to state for protection, this is not achieved through 
laws, but through the hiring of private services of some state official. The population 
considers the payment of taxes as dual taxation as everyone buys state services privately 
(Kosals, 1999:7). 
Contrary to laissez-faire advocacy of neo-liberals, those on the left consider 
informality as a new method of big business to bypass labor unions and subcontract pieces 
of their work at lower wage rates (Weiss, 1987). Behind the rhetoric of promoting 
entrepreneurship and national growth and being a safety net for the poor, the informal 
sector is depressing the already declining wage rates in the formal sector thus pushing even 
formal workers into informality. Informal economy means the disenfranchisement of the 
institutionalized power conquered by labor (Portes, Castells and Benton, 1989:11). It turns 
industrial workers into self-employed artisans, part-time home laborers and odd jobbers 
who do not even consider themselves as a part of working class.5 One example given for 
this the hypothesis is the case of Italy. There, the victories of labor unions brought about a 
serious decline in the capitalist profits especially in the 1960s. This situation has only been 
                                                 
5
 This fact is highly relevancy for the case of women, who, although making a significant 
contribution to family budget that sometimes exceeds that of their husbands, do not 
consider themselves as workers or breadwinners. 
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reversed, with the subsequent proliferation of artisan enterprises which were made 
exempted from provisions of tax-code and statute of labor if they employed less than 
fifteen workers. This decentralization, as one can guess, gave an initial stimulus to the 
expansion of informal sector in Italy (Portes, Castells and Benton, 1989:23).  
Today, in many countries, both developing and developed, the practice of 
subcontracting is one of the indispensable strategies of big firms to sustain their 
competitiveness. The rhetoric of international competitiveness became especially more 
acute after the economic crisis of 1970s. When the boom years of import substitution 
policies came to an end with the OPEC oil-crises, millions of people became unemployed. 
In that kind of a desperate situation, people accepted the most humiliating working 
conditions for the sake of sustaining their daily living. Big firms in trying to recover from 
the supply-side shocks of the 1970s utilized downsizing heavily and preferred outsourcing 
pieces of their work to small and often informal enterprises to decrease labor costs. The 
critical question about this last global downturn is whether this reversal in the relationship 
between capital and labor is temporary or not. The expulsion of a significant portion of the 
proletariat into the ranks of unemployed and the decentralization of the working 
environment coupled with the willingness of urban poor to endure harsher working 
conditions for personal survival enhanced opportunities for exploitation (Portes, Castells 
and Benton, 1989:309). 
Obviously for such a socio-economic transformation to take place the state has to 
approve the current arrangement or at least should show signs of inertia to fight with 
informality. The abuse of labor regulations can only take place if the state is too weak to 
enforce its rules, or if the governments turn a blind eye to the situation to promote 
competitiveness of formal sector firms, economic growth, employment opportunities for 
the poor or simply to guarantee votes for the upcoming elections. The moving boundaries 
of the informal sector will depend on the dynamics of social struggles and political 
bargaining.  
Neo-liberals advocate that what the informal sector can accomplish will only be 
realized if we could successfully get the state out of the economy. Yet, contrary to such 
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assumptions, governments' response to informal activities in most of the developing world 
did not take the form of a hostile reaction to such activities as a form of tax evasion. On the 
contrary, the relations had been marked by support and getting the state into the economy 
to provide the necessary support to small scale entrepreneurial initiatives. There are 
obvious reasons for such state tolerance. The state may be tolerating these activities 
because it is a survival mechanism of the poor and especially in the developing world the 
poor constitute the bulk of the electorate. Any move to eradicate informality, i.e. the 
demolishing of illegal housings or the closing down of informal sweatshops, will mean a 
loss of votes for the incumbent government. The private enrichment of state functionaries 
can also be counted as a reason. The promotion of the competitiveness of formal sector 
firms, by legalizing subcontracting arrangements is also another reason for such state 
tolerance.  
Local or municipal governments seem to be more crucial in the growth of informality 
since they are not circumscribed by the policy debates that paralyze national-level 
initiatives nor do their decisions have an impact on the overall macroeconomic objectives.6 
Central governments concern about macroeconomic objectives may explain the slowness 
with which governments have responded to decentralization and informal sector expansion 
(Portes, Castells and Benton, 1989:307). 
The interest in informal sector in Turkey is also on the rise both due to the scale of 
such activities and the current determination of the government to fight with informality. 
With ever increasing urbanization rates and deregulated markets a safe haven is created for 
informal economic activity ranging from Laleli district transnational shuttle traders to 
neighborhood grocery stores, from restaurant owners to bakery shops, from tailors to textile 
producers. The importance of informal transnational trade is so great that even the Trade 
balance of Turkey had to be adjusted with 'shuttle trade' magnitudes. It is not only the 
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 In India and Russia, for instance, local governments force local power companies to 
provide free energy to some businesses; subsidies such as these allow informal businesses 
to continue operating. Source: McKinsey Quarterly, “Hidden dangers of Informal 
Economy” July 2004, no:3  at www.mckinseyquarterly.com. 
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transnational aspect of informal sector in Turkey that makes it so important. Living with 
informality has huge political, economic and sociological consequences.  
Economically living with an expanding informal sector means the use of backward 
technology, lack of innovation and investment in the enterprise and the human capital. It 
also creates an active labor force that escapes official statistics. It is true that the informal 
sector has a job creating potential and has an economic contribution to GNP. Yet, the 
potential for economic growth of such small enterprises is no match with that of large-
formal firms whose returns to scale is beyond comparison with informal firms. Despite 
their low levels of productivity and smaller scale, the substantial cost advantages that 
informal companies gain by avoiding taxes and regulations helps them stay in business. 
Competition is distorted because inefficient informal players prevent formal companies 
from gaining market share. Any short-term employment benefits of informality are thus 
greatly outweighed by its long-term negative impact on economic growth and job creation. 
Sociologically it means the continuing abuse of child and female labor. The portion 
of the labor force that is most prone to abuse, low-pay and harsher working conditions is 
that of children and women. Putting-out is still a very widespread practice among women, 
who at times contribute more to the household economy than the traditional breadwinners. 
The irony in all of this is that they do not consider themselves in any sense as a worker or 
an equal breadwinner let alone an exploited laborer. In addition, countries with greater 
disparities between rich and poor have larger informal sectors. The poor will find it difficult 
to get jobs in the formal economy and will be forced to find an opportunity in informal 
sector (Uslaner and Badescu, 2004b:14). 
Before tackling the political side of the phenomenon, I have to explain what is meant 
by informal sector in the simplest sense of the term. The standard definition that one can 
use for informal sector is “a process of income-generation which is unregulated by the 
institutions of society in a legal and social environment in which similar activities are 
regulated” (Portes, Castells and Benton, 1989:12). This definition encompasses the totality 
of informal activities, but due to its generality, it does not capture the variety in the 
informal sector. Apart from being called a sector, the range of activities undertaken within 
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the informal sector is far from being identical. When decomposed into its sub-segments, 
one gets a better picture of its diversity. 
Jim Thomas (2001) offers two useful criteria in trying to expose this diversity within 
the informal sector. One is whether market transactions are involved, the other is whether 
the goods and services or the processes of production are legal or illegal. Household sector 
does not involve market transactions, goods and services are produced within the 
household. The informal sector produces goods and services in an unregulated way. The 
underground sector refers to the production of goods and services that are legal but the 
processes of production and distribution remain illegal, usually in the form of tax evasion. 
In the criminal sector, the goods and services as well as their production and distribution 
remain illegal. All these three components make up what we call informal sector. 
This definition covers a diversity of activities, ranging from a private tutor whose 
price for a one-hour math lecture is 100 million TL, to a street seller who earns hardly 100 
million TL for a month. Precisely, due to this multi-faceted nature of the informal activities, 
the equation of informality studies to poverty studies is questionable. For many scholars, 
the informal economy is not a survival activity performed by 'marginal people' trying to get 
over the subsistence line. A quotation can be useful here: 
“Studies in both advanced industrial and less developed countries have shown the 
economic dynamism of unregulated income-generating activities and the relatively high 
levels of income of many informal entrepreneurs, sometimes above the level of workers in 
the formal economy.... The informal economy is not a euphemism for poverty....Although 
most of the people engaging in informal activities are poor, especially in the Third World; 
informal economic practices cut across may social structures” (Portes, Castells and Benton, 
1989:12). 
These studies point out to the fact that people working in the informal sector are not 
homogeneous. The informal sector is based on a relationship between a waged laborer who 
does not possess any legal protection and social security and an informal entrepreneur who 
is either in subcontracting relationship with formal firms, or is directly marketing the 
produce of the workers. In most of the cases the informal entrepreneurs and employers are 
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better off than formal sector workers.7 In cases where the firm at hand is a family firm or 
industrial homework, they do not even consider themselves as workers, exploitation is 
hidden under complicity. 
Leaving aside the role of informal sector for economic growth and survival of the 
poor to development theorists, we would like to dwell on the political consequences of 
living in informality. In press and academic publications, we usually talk about what the 
big business thinks about certain state actions, what it wants from the state, its ideological 
positioning etc. Of course, we can not expect informal sector to have that much a stake in 
the 'high politics' of any country. Informal sector players are not organized like big 
conglomerates since they are usually in the form of small and medium sized enterprises , 
but that does not imply that they do not have an effective voice in shaping local 
government's policies or that they do not have any stake in being involved in politics. 
A very good example that illustrates how the state has to accommodate rather than 
regulate such illegal practices is the case of land markets in Turkey. In his work on “Land, 
Shelter and Informality in the Periphery” Keyder (2000) argues that what distinguishes the 
expanding informal sector in the periphery countries from that of the informal sector in core 
countries (since informality is also on the rise in the advanced capitalist world) is the 
divergent perceptions of 'law of real property'. This different perception directly affects the 
attitudes about legal order and state. 
In the case of big cities of Turkey such as Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Bursa large 
portions of the population live in illegal housing. In some cases, these buildings are built on 
public land or land belonging to private owners. In other instances, the construction has 
violated zoning regulations by building on farmland, green area or construction has been 
carried out by ignoring construction regulations (Keyder, 2000:120). A measurement of the 
contribution of illegal constructions to informal sector is lacking. Keyder proposes that it 
could very well be the most important component if we consider the fact that informal 
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 The study conducted by Eder (2004) in the Laleli district transnational trade point out to 
the fact that shop owners despite the risks of going bankrupt due to the volatility of their 
business, earn incredibly lucrative salaries compared to an average Turkish citizen. 
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neighborhoods (shantytowns in daily language) constitute from a quarter to the half of total 
building stock in large cities of the developing world.8  The value created by the family 
labor during the preparation of the plot, construction of the building and the continuing 
additions, do not appear in figures of the formal economy. What is more, the value created 
by this illegal building stock is always increasing due to two reasons: The houses are 
always in the building process and the rent of the building increases as it turns into an 
apartment and moves into central or desirable districts due to further expansion of the city.  
What is the reaction of the state towards all this illegal activity? Is it a mere observer, 
a contributor or a fighter against such informal activity? Some observers refer to the current 
inertia of local officials in the face of proliferation of shantytowns as “the benign 
negligence of the state” that can be justified on moral grounds (Bura, 1998). The concept 
of moral economy dates back to middle Ages where many societies held a popular 
consensus about what constituted legitimate or illegitimate practice on the part of the state. 
For example, the food riots in 18th century England did not occur out of a sheer desperation 
of hopeless people. These people considered the provision of cheap bread as a moral 
obligation on the part of the state and the failure to do so triggered mass outrage. The 
current immigrants seem to refer to the same old notion of this morality when they defend 
their shantytowns. The obligation of the state in satisfying the basic necessities of the 
masses forms the basis of such expectations and paternalist politicians take a lenient 
position in the face of land plunder by new immigrants. The state, torn between accepting 
capitalist principles of ownership and the moral economy, had to give in to the popular 
demands of mass immigrants as it could not come up with a viable solution to 
accommodate these newcomers. The problem stems from the deficiencies of the 
redistributive mechanisms in the face of hyper-urbanization. The state as it failed provide 
the urban poor with redistributive mechanisms such as cheap housing or subsidies had to 
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 In a labor-intensive sector such as construction, the informality can go up as high as 80 % 
of employment. Source: Mckinsey quarterly “Hidden Dangers of Informal Economy” July 
2004, number:3 at www.mckinseyquarterly.com. 
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give consent to these illegal practices.9 The problem lies in the inability of the state to 
replace redistributive mechanisms with that of communal networks and reciprocity. In the 
end, the society perceives the legal order presented by the state as a burden that has to 
bypassed, battled or bribed (Keyder, 2000:128). 
Furthermore, what can be initially regarded as generosity or open consent on the part 
of the state can very well give way to negative reciprocity (Bura, 1998:308). What is 
meant by this negative reciprocity is the expectation of both the state officials and the 
rentiers that they will be better off if they maintain the survival of this order. State officials 
will guarantee votes or economic benefits, i.e. bribes, with a timely ignorance just before 
the elections the rentiers will legalize their business and be able to market their now multi-
storey apartments. So, it is really hard to draw the line between where the state is 
deliberately being generous, and where it is captured by parochial interests. In fact, most of 
the time, state agents are engaged and embedded in this patronage network for the sake of 
their own interests.  
Hence informal economy comes forward with its own informal political institutions 
which comprises of clientelism, patronage, mafia-type relations and corruption. Corruption 
and clientelism can also be observed in the relations between big formal business and the 
state, but it is not the rule of the game. In informal sector however, the survival of the 
whole sector depends on the deliberate negligence of the state. So what we have in hand is 
more of an embedded corruption than a pragmatic state (Eder, 2004:18).  
One proposition that I will make is that in those countries where there is widespread 
corruption, one should also expect to see large informal sector. This proposition will be 
tested when I do the quantitative analysis. Secondly, the level of corruption is very much 
related to the bureaucratic quality of countries. In places where the bureaucracy has 
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 The depiction of the problem of illegal housing by media as a last resort of helpless people 
instead of an open violation of property rights also manifests the ways in which the society 
perceives the case. For an excellent evaluation of immoral economy of housing look at 
Bura (1998). 
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impersonal functioning mechanisms with qualified personnel, corruption will be less likely 
to overwhelm the country in perspective.  
Before trying to formulate the relationship between corruption and informality, I have 
to talk about the ways in which a society might perceive an action as a corrupt one, rather 
than a legitimate form of behavior. I will define corruption as “the use of power by political 
authorities and/or public servants outside their duties, in order to serve personal interests or 
the interests of those who, they feel, belong to the same group as themselves” (Adaman and 
Çarkolu, 2003:120). This definition encompasses acts such as bribery, favoritism, 
nepotism, cronyism and political clientelism. Obviously such practices bring the most 
lucrative profits where the business and political interests meet. According to Bayley 
(1999) societies, in which corruption has become a common practice, the following hazards 
are expected to occur: 
• The resources which could be allocated to public benefit, goes to private pockets, 
hence undermining distributive justice. When corruption brings great economic benefits to 
a small minority in society, it aggravates income inequality. 
• Corruption means a rise in the costs of public administration. The man who is a 
taxpayer and also forced to resort to bribery is paying a double price for the same service. 
Hence it creates great market inefficiencies. It also undermines business productivity, as 
resources which could be used for innovation or other improvements are used for lobbying. 
• In societies where there is pervasive corruption, domestic entrepreneurs are 
discouraged from making new investments. Not only would domestic investors flee the 
country, but also foreign investors would also not consider the country in question as an 
attractive investment region. 
• The pervasiveness of corruption in the public institutions undermines the morale of 
both honest public officials and good willed citizens. It lowers respect for political 
authority and decreases the legitimacy of political institutions. With the conviction that 
'corruption does pay' man-in-the street also looses his of merit-based understanding of 
personal achievement, starts to look for ways of creating special contacts, rather than invest 
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in personal improvement. The implications of this kind of an understanding is destructive 
both at the individual and collective level. A person who thinks advancement in life 
depends on connections and favoritism will loose his sense of control over his life. Such 
low morale, if applied for the whole society will mean loss of idealism and devotion to 
moral values and a disbelief in citizenship responsibilities. The most obvious example of 
this disbelief shows itself in the case of taxation. If the image a society has about the 
politician and the public official is 'corrupt', it would be naïve to expect a sense of 
responsibility towards the state (Bayley, 1999:943). 
Despite the fact that the criteria to distinguish what is corruption and what is not, is 
very straightforward, public perceptions about what constitutes an act of corruption may 
differ substantially from the definition we have made above. As Bayley points out “an act 
is corrupt if the surrounding society condemns it” (Bayley, 1999:938). In many developing 
nations, it is quite legitimate to make gift payments to officials, to use official positions to 
obtain jobs for relatives or to give a private fee to tax collectors for ignoring the informal 
business. In that sense it is difficult to apply Western moral codes to determine what should 
be condemned as corrupt behavior. One explanation for such societal differences comes 
from Rose-Ackerman: 
“Societies based on strong interpersonal relations may have little notion of formal 
agency-principal relations and the obligations they impose on agents. The idea that one has 
distinct responsibilities to a superior-separate from ties of loyalty, friendship and kinship-
may seem strange and unnatural. Such societies will have difficulty establishing modern 
bureaucracies, with civil servants hired on the basis of skills who are expected to separate 
their roles as officials from their roles as friends or relatives. Citizens expect that personal 
ties with officials are needed to get anything done and think it quite appropriate to reward 
helpful officials with gifts and tips” (Rose-Ackerman, 1999:106). 
In such societies loyalty to family, friends and coworkers dominates loyalty to state. 
It is argued by some scholars that the societies that would mostly disapprove of petty 
corruption as a harmful phenomenon are those which do not live with it (Uslaner and 
Badescu, 2004a:10).  
Secondly, it is true that elite malfeasance creates a loss of faith among the citizens. 
But as long as the citizens are able to get their share from this immoral practice, the 
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damaging affects of corruption on the political psychology of citizens is not as big as it 
might be expected. Johnston argues that corruption can be an integrative force if it is 
routinized in a society (Johnston, 1999: 992-1003). If corruption in a society is 
characterized by ease of joining, if it is inclusive, it will have an integrative force and its 
illegitimacy will not be questioned. For example, unfair enrichment of high state officials 
will be disapproved by many people and undermine the trust in state institutions because 
only a small fraction of people can benefit from such big corruption cases. Yet, what we 
call petty corruption, those gifts and tips that we all resort to when needed, are forms of 
behavior that everybody can benefit from, hence inclusive. 
Informality in that sense falls into integrative and inclusive form of corruption. In line 
with Johnston (1999) I will call informal economy as market corruption since it bypasses 
market regulations such as product quality, health and safety restrictions, rules of market 
competition and taxation policies. Yet, due to its inclusive and integrative nature-as it 
draws buyers and sellers into networks of mutual self-interest- it can become quite large 
and pervasive.  
The link between corruption and informality should be decomposed into two 
categories, that of petty corruption and big corruption. One interpretation about the link 
between corruption and informality is that perceptions about the prevalence of big 
corruption in a society, that is unfair practices at the highest political positions, breeds 
distrust in the state, hence this exclusive form of corruption might be breeding disobedient 
behavior such as not paying your taxes and engaging in informal economy. Yet, it could 
also be the case that, big corruption does not have that much influence on routinized 
practices such as informality. It could very well be the case that people consider such 
informal practices as normal and beneficial for the society and they may see no reason in 
condemning it. In countries where there is widespread corruption one may not 
automatically observe low levels of trust in state as long as people get their fair shares from 
this practice.  
What about the relationship between trust and informality. In the informal sector, 
economic activity usually goes along with principles of reciprocity. The members of the 
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same ethnic, racial and religious identity are responsible for the well being of each and 
every other member of the same community.10 Especially in the urban informal sector; 
family members, relatives, ethnic ties may constitute the only safety belt for these people. 
Most of the time, an informal sector worker is either working for a family enterprise or for 
an entrepreneur whom he has a provincial, ethnic or religious tie. The relationship may 
perfectly look like the one between the capitalist employer and the exploited worker, yet 
neither the worker nor the employer sees themselves and their relations as an exploited-
exploiter relationship. Complicity rather than exploitation is the norm. Such communal 
solidarity guarantees peaceful relations among firms with same local origins and peaceful 
relations between the enterprise owner and the workers who are often relatives. In their 
relations they rely more on this communal solidarity more often than the enforcement of 
the state. In the smooth functioning of informal sector, trust is more crucial than state 
guarantee since informal sector actors cannot rely on the legal enforcement in the case of a 
breach of business promise. The use of these ethnic, religious bonds would not be 
surprising in an illegal business where promises and words have to take the place of written 
contracts and bills; and where norms, values, reciprocity and trust matter more than state 
enforcement. That is why in most developmental studies, social capital usually takes the 
place of bank credits, promissory notes and many other legal instruments to make business. 
For example, the rotating credit associations are a clear sign that informal activities that 
operate outside the guarantee provided by the state have to rely on nothing but trust, 
networks and norms.11 
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 In the case of Islamic economy, Kuran thinks one of the major factors that has fueled 
economic Islamization is that an Islamic sub-economy helps its participants cope with the 
prevailing adversities by fostering interpersonal trust. The Islamic sub-economy enables the 
newcomers to big cities like Cairo and Istanbul to establish business relationships with a 
diverse pool of ambitious, hard-working, but culturally handicapped people. Their shared 
commitment to Islam keeps many of their activities within social circles in which 
information about dishonest behavior spreads quickly, thus providing a basis for mutual 
trust. Look at Kuran (1995) for details. 
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 In rotating credit associations found in many countries around the world, members 
contribute to a regular fund all of which is given to a single member on a rotating basis. 
The question relevant to social capital literature is: why do not the participants drop out 
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Economic sociologists when talking about social capital and trust operating within 
informal economy, usually invoke the instrumentality and vitality of solidarity networks 
such as neighborhoods, ethnic and religious ties and closed family structure. They refer to 
re-ethnification of identities, which means being from the same city, region or ethnicity 
which did not have much meaning before, gains enormous instrumentality once people 
migrate to new localities. The durability of such informal ties created by successful 
immigrant groups may have less to do with the long term persistence of outside 
discrimination than with the ability of these networks to compete effectively with resources 
and rewards available in the broader society 12 (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993:20).  
The trust in state and trust in one's close circle take on totally different meanings in 
the case of informality. It is obvious that there is no reliance or trust in state in the informal 
sector. In fact, state's lack of competence and legitimacy may very well be the reason for 
large scale informality. In the case of judicial matters related to keeping of business 
promises, people do not trust the state to resolve disputes fairly and efficiently, so they look 
to alternative sources of justice. Trust in state has nothing to do with close personal ties. In 
weaving such intimate ties with others people expect favoritism and certain privileges, 
whereas trust in state usually breeds an expectation of fairness and procedural justice. Rose-
Ackerman (1999) argues this parochial trust based on personal ties, facilitates corrupt 
practices. The closer the ties you have with your intimate circle (who are usually your 
coworkers in your informal business) the more favors and privileges you expect from your 
close associates.  
Here, it will be useful to make a clear distinction between the trust used in economic 
sociology and political science. Economic sociologists when talking about social capital 
and trust operating within informal economy, usually invoke the instrumentality and 
                                                                                                                                                    
once they receive the pot? Answer lies in the interpersonal trust. Without it, such 
associations would not have been possible. 
12
 For example, Eder in her research on Laleli shuttle trade found out that there are basically 
three main solidarity groups within Laleli market. One is the migrant community from 
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. The other is the Kurdish community. The last one is the Islamic 
community. In fact, most of the members of LASIAD, the businessmen association of 
Laleli are rumored to be both religious and mostly from Erzurum (Eder, 2004: 12). 
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vitality of solidarity networks such as neighborhoods, ethnic and religious ties and closed 
family structure. In political science literature however, trust in others takes on a different 
meaning. Trusting your relative, neighbor or friend is not a sign of social capital since it is 
quite normal for a person to trust somebody that she/he knows well. Social capital should 
make you trust your fellow citizen, so that you can believe in the possibility of working for 
a common cause with somebody that you do not know very well.  
A brief theoretical background on the notion of trust as an important component of 
social capital in political science literature will be useful here. We will define social capital 
in a very broad fashion as obligations and expectations, information channels, norms and 
effective sanctions that shape the attitudes and actions of members of a specific 
community, be it a neighborhood, a criminal band or a nation (Tonkiss, Passey, Fenton and 
Hems, 2000:78). 
Scholars' conceptualizations of social capital have largely varied. The narrowest of all 
belong to Putnam (1993). Putnam defines social capital as a set of “horizontal associations” 
among people who have an effect on the productivity of the community. These associations 
include “networks of civic engagement” and social norms. These networks and the norms 
associated with them facilitate coordination and cooperation for the benefit of the 
participants (Serageldin and Grootaert, 2000:46). In his path-breaking work on Italy, 
Putnam defines the single most important determinant that makes democracy work and 
which also distinguishes North Italy from the South as the 'civic engagement' which he 
measured with indicators such as the vibrancy of associational life, newspaper readership 
and political participation. He also proposes that strong personal ties (such as kinship) are 
less crucial than weak horizontal ties (such as acquaintanceship in a civic association) for 
the maintenance of a strong civic culture (Adaman and Çarkolu, 2003:128).  
The proposition that Italian society is marked by low levels of interpersonal trust has 
a long history. The first scholar to observe this was Banfield (1958). He calls the specific 
form of this low trust in others in Italy as “amoral familism”- the absence of feelings of 
moral obligations towards anyone outside the nuclear family. The order of the day is: 
“Maximize the material, short-run advantage of the nuclear family; assume that all others 
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will do likewise” (Banfield, 1958:83). Banfield attributes this inability to act together for 
the common good as a side-affect of extreme poverty and backwardness (Misztal, 
1998:193). 
Gambetta makes an extension to this debate by arguing that amoral familism is not 
irrational but the only survival strategy in the harsh living conditions of the southern Italy. 
In a situation of centuries of oppression and poverty, it would be highly naïve to expect 
people to be supportive of the state or any other collaborative alternatives. Lack of trust in 
the institutions of the state and the communal mechanisms leaves the only refuge in the 
immediate family or certain patronage networks like Mafia. The emergence of mafia takes 
place when two conditions are met: where there is demand for private protection because of 
lack of trust in the community and the state and where there is the presence of supply of it 
(Gambetta 1993:3352, Misztal 1998:195). 
Mafia uses its resources of loyalty and resulting expectations of behavior for illegal 
activities which is a part of informal economy (Deakin, 2001:72). If analyzed closer, it will 
be realized that the defining characteristics of mafia such as obligations and expectations, 
norms and effective sanctions and informal information channels are all defining 
characteristics of social capital. In fact the lack of positive characteristics of social capital-
namely, high levels of interpersonal trust, the faith in civic engagement as a way of 
improving society- creates another form of social capital which is negative in essence due 
to its being closed to outside world and being to the detriment of the healthy functioning 
society. So, Putnam's conceptualization of social capital in which he equates social capital 
with civic engagement and political activism is just one face of social capital. There is also 
negative social capital which emerges as a specific form in the case of mafia and amoral 
familism. Of course, the emergence of mafia is also a specific feature of societies with low 
levels of trust in the protection provided by the state, yet it does not change the reality that 
it is a highly reliable and closely knit organization with its norms, obligations and 
expectations.  
Another criticism about Putnam's understanding of social capital is “his neglect of 
vertical networks and the positive role the state can perform” for boosting the trust and 
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social capital in society (Deakin, 2001:76). The usefulness of Coleman's definition of social 
capital becomes more apparent at this instance. He provides a broader definition by 
depicting social capital as “a variety of different entities with two elements in common: 
they all consist of some aspect of social structure and they facilitate certain actions of 
actors- whether personal or corporate actors- within the structure” (Coleman, 1988:598). 
This definition enables scholars to extend the definition of social capital to vertical as well 
as horizontal networks and the behavior of other entities such as firms (Serageldin and 
Grootaert, 2000:46). Another contribution of Coleman to the literature is his claim that “a 
given form of social capital that is valuable in facilitating certain actions may be useless or 
even harmful for the others” (Coleman, 1988:598). In this way, one can point out to the 
existence of mafia as a specific form of social capital but will also observe that this kind of 
social capital is to the detriment of other forms of engagements such as associational life or 
healthy functioning state-society relationship. 
The inclusion of vertical networks into the definition of social capital is crucial. The 
weak horizontal ties as envisaged by Putnam are not enough to explain the emergence of 
high interpersonal trust in a society. Misztal argues that “not only relations among people 
and the density of their networks but also trustworthy government, having support from and 
contributing to increasing satisfaction in the functioning of institutions, can play an 
important role in creating and maintaining trust. In turn this social capital can enhance 
institutional performance by lowering the cost of information about the trustworthiness of 
others, thus enhancing an informal solution to the problem of cooperation” (Misztal, 
1998:198). Of course the state and society have their different logics as well as their 
intersection points. But one thing is for sure: State structures and institutions such as 
government, political regime and rule of law, court systems and civil and political liberties 
have an obvious effect on fostering political and social activity among the citizenry. The 
state and its institutions are responsible agents to foster social solidarity and reduce social 
tensions (Misztal, 1998:209). 
If the society perceives the state and its institutions as negligent, corrupt and 
oppressive, the citizens will see no good in coming together to influence politics or 
engaging in any association. Hirschman's classification of exit (desertion), voice 
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(articulation) and loyalty seems very useful in trying to explain both inertia and dissident 
behavior on the part of citizens (Hirschman, 1970:80). It is not enough to have a voice 
option in the system to get engaged in political activism, what is also needed is loyalty to 
the existing political order. If there is no loyalty to the system coupled with a non-
conducive environment for expressing the resentment, the exit option will be more heavily 
utilized which will contribute more to the belief that nothing can be changed with collective 
action. If everybody thinks in that fashion, nobody will believe in the power of collectivity 
which will further reduce the interpersonal trust that is needed for civic engagement. The 
examples in which voice and loyalty options is missing, what is commonly observed is 
decreasing levels of solidarity and a dismantling of the relationship between economic 
interest and loyalty (Misztal, 1998:201).  
One example for this is informal economy. The emergence of informal sector can be 
attributed to the increase in unemployment (usually made up of unskilled immigrants) and 
lack of positions in the formal sector. The desire of big business to remain competitive in 
the (inter)national context is also conducive to informality. Yet, economic reasons are not 
adequate to explain why the citizens, firms, workers and employers are recalcitrant towards 
state intervention into their economic activities. The persistence of informality as a specific 
form of tax evasion and corruption has its roots in the political realm.  
What is then the relation between informal economy and social capital? Especially 
how are we to relate this primarily economic phenomenon to state-society relations? The 
political dimension of the matter becomes clearer when informality is conceptualized as a 
specific standing vis-à-vis the state characterized by corruption and tax-evasion. 
In this thesis I approach informal economy as an important component of corruption 
which we named as market corruption (look at p.19). The main reason for such a 
conceptualization is that informality means the breach of market regulations such as 
product quality, health and safety restrictions, rules of market competition and taxation 
policies. But, such a breach of law is not enough to call informality corruption. What makes 
it a type of corruption is the deliberate ignorance of political authorities or public servants 
in order to serve personal interests or the interests of those who, they feel belong to the 
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same group as themselves. Informal enterprises sooner or later attract the attention of state 
officials. At those critical instances, their survival depends on their ability to establish 
'intimate ties' with lower level state officials through corrupt deals such as gift payments.13 
As informal sector consists of production of goods and provision of services which do not 
appear in the formal economy (as a part of GNP), any corrupt deal (such as gifts, tips and 
bribes) made between state officials and informal players is a service transaction not billed 
and registered, hence a part of informal sector per se. If the survival of informality relies on 
the prevalence of corruption in society, it should be our duty to point out to this relationship 
to offer policy recommendations. 
An expanding informal sector also means pervasive tax-evasion. Paying taxes is 
maybe 'the' most important citizenship responsibility in modern state. If a society is 
composed of a significant portion of people who think there is no need to pay taxes or that 
if caught, paying bribes would solve the matter, than there surely is a crisis of state-society 
relations. People should be thinking that either the state is incapable of delivering the 
services it is entitled to with the taxes it collects from its citizens, or they may be thinking 
that even if service delivery is possible, it does not take place on an impersonal basis, some 
people are favored over the others in terms of reaching such services. And if they think that 
having access to resources has nothing to do with fulfilling your citizenship responsibilities, 
with a rational choice they will opt for being a free-rider rather than a cheated responsible 
citizen. 
Economists usually refer to this phenomenon as free-rider or collective action 
problem and assert that it has nothing to do with trust. Compliance is not a function of trust, 
but is a function of enforcement capacity of the state. Why should a trusting citizen comply 
if the same benefits are available without compliance? It would be easy to detect non-
compliant members in a small tightly knit society but in our modern world the mass 
societies we are living in, non-compliance is harder to detect and punish. Despite this 
                                                 
13
 Eder (2003) in her work on Laleli shuttle- traders explores the dimensions of this kind of 
an embedded corruption. Almost all of the shopkeepers interviewed admitted that they 
resort to bribery whenever needed and that Turkish state officials such as police, 
municipalities, tax collectors and customs officials are all part of this game. 
 27 
opportunity, not all the people opt for being free riders. Scholz in his surveys on tax-payers' 
behaviors found out that variables such as trust in government and trust in citizens and a 
sense of duty were very effective in shaping decisions about paying taxes, even after 
controlling variables such as 'fear of being caught' (Scholz, 1998:144-156).  
There are two highly relevant examples: Post-communist and Scandinavian countries. 
These examples depict what declining levels of trust in state institutions imply for 
informality, corruption and low levels of interpersonal trust. 
Russia constitutes a vivid example of a society in which state failure creates 
alternative sources of trust in society. What is meant by state failure is the inability of state 
institutions to deliver services to citizens in an impersonal manner in accordance with the 
rule of law. One vivid example of such state failure is the case of wage payments. The 
social capital survey conducted in Russia, found out that less than two in five people 
receive the wage or pension to which they are entitled (Rose, 2000:154). State pensions, 
one of the most indispensable responsibilities of the modern state, are even more likely to 
be paid late. In such a context, the people are obliged to compensate the inefficiencies of 
the bureaucratic system by de-bureaucratizing and personalizing previously formal 
relationships. Rose argues that organizational failure in the Russian context is not 
necessarily a sign that nothing works but that organizations in general and state institutions 
in particular do not work according to the logic of a modern state characterized by equal 
access and impersonal service delivery. If such a situation arises individuals invoke a 
variety of informal social capital network to get things done (Rose, 2000:159). Some of 
these anti-modern tactics that Russians have to utilize are begging or cajoling officials to 
get a certain service from the state such as begging officials to admit person to hospital or 
keep demanding action at social security office to get paid. Another tactic is using 
connections to get an official to bend and break the rules. Paying cash money to officials 
for a service that a normal citizen should be entitled for free is another method. The break-
down of extensive social security services provided during communism, also brought the 
break-down of the faith in the state as a trustworthy institution towards which citizens 
should fulfill their responsibilities. In the New Russia Barometer Survey conducted in 
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1998, 56 % of the Russians expressed that there is no need to pay taxes, 77 % believe a 
cash payment to a tax-official would be enough to evade taxes (Rose, 2000:158).  
Another vivid example of how state performance can affect the levels of trust comes 
from Kumlin and Rothstein's (2003) work about the impact of state on social capital in 
Sweden. They challenge the commonly held assumption that when people are protected 
from the cradle- to- the -grave by a strong welfare state, their associational life will be 
crowded-out. Contrary to the belief that when social obligations become public, intimate 
ties will weaken between citizens, they argue for the opposite by claiming that well-
functioning political institutions have positive effects on citizen's willingness to comply and 
cooperate in society. They propose that citizen's trustworthiness and law abiding nature is 
not affected by the vibrancy of associational life but it is rather determined by the perceived 
performance of democratic and bureaucratic institutions (Kumlin and Rothstein, 2003:5). 
Their starting point is the procedural justice involved in citizen's relations with state 
institutions. Procedural justice is concerned with whether the individual was received with 
respect and dignity, whether he/she was able to communicate opinions to the civil servants 
and if the services in question was delivered devoid of discrimination and corruption 
(Kumlin and Rothstein, 2003:11). The legitimacy of the political system depends on the 
extent to which this procedural justice is achieved. But, what is the relation between 
interpersonal trust and procedural justice? Their answer is the following: 
“First, people may make inferences about others' trustworthiness from how they 
perceive public bureaucrats. If social workers, policemen, public health workers etc. act in 
such a way that they cannot be trusted, nor can people in general be trusted. Secondly if 
most people in order to get what they themselves deem necessary from the public services, 
because of how the system operates, usually engage in distorting vital information 
(cheating) and other forms of dishonest behavior then the logical inference is that most 
people cannot be trusted. Thirdly, if you yourself have to engage in this sort of dishonest 
behavior then people like you cannot be trusted thus the inference made is that neither the 
people in general should be trusted” (Kumlin and Rothstein, 2003:13).  
They test the validity of this hypothesis in the case of one of the most trusting 
societies in the world, Sweden. Sweden also matches the criteria of the work since it is a 
country with big government with universal welfare services. They prove in line with the 
procedural justice argument, that universality and impersonal nature of welfare state in 
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Sweden fosters trust. Their claim is that the road to a more solidaristic society goes through 
creating a system of institutions which makes people interdependent, such as the case of a 
fair taxation system where every citizen contributes to a pool of resources from which the 
public in general and the needy in particular benefit. In such a setting reciprocity and 
fairness will become formal behaviors in those roles. In such a system, trust in other people 
can be defined as the confidence with which we expect others to be constrained by the 
duties and requirements attached to their roles (Mistzal, 1998:226-227). In Sweden, state is 
able to collect 98 % of the taxes as opposed to 26 % in Russia (Uslaner and Badescu, 
2004a:7). 
By claiming that trust in state can be increased by making the proper institutional 
ameliorations, trust is endogenized. In other words, it is turned into a dependent variable. 
This approach can be traced back to scholars such as Coleman (1988) and Granovetter 
(1985) who explicitly embedded social capital in a rational- choice model, which resembles 
the recent institutional approaches which try to identify conditions under which trust can be 
generated.  
Taking trust as a rather predetermined trait makes it exogenous hence independent of 
social changes and political engineering. The exogenous-endogenous distinction is not a 
picayune interest for social scientists, as the answer to this question has important policy 
implications. If, for example trust is a stable and predetermined variable then a policy effort 
such as decreasing corruption in the name of increasing trust in state so that people will be 
more willing to pay their taxes is a dream. Uslaner (2004a) although having modified some 
of his views about institutional capacity in changing levels of trust, argues against the 
claims of Rothstein on the grounds that trust is the determining factor in creating the 
healthy institutional set-up of Scandinavian countries. He proposes that trust in legal system 
in Sweden does not breed interpersonal trust; it is the other way round. Swedes and other 
Westerners can develop strong legal systems because people trust each other (Uslaner and 
Badescu, 2004a:3). 
Secondly and contrary to our initial arguments about the correlation between trust and 
corruption, he argues that people are more likely to link their perceptions of trust with 
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corruption in countries where there is rule of law, accountability and transparency. In 
countries such as post-communist ones, where such attributes are lacking, corruption is 
widespread at the societal level so interpersonal trust is highly unlikely to be affected from 
perceptions about corruption (Uslaner and Badescu, 2004a:4). Corruption and informality 
are a way of life for them, hence people would not be too harsh about others engaged in 
such activities. In Uslaner's words: “When it is all around you, you do not bother yourself 
too much” (Uslaner and Badescu 2004a:10). 
With this theoretical background in mind, there are two roads to approach the issue of 
informality. One can interpret informality as reaction to state intrusion in economic affairs 
due to low levels of solidarity. As has been pointed out by many scholars, large informal 
economy is a sign that people have little faith in the government's ability to manage the 
economy and little faith in other citizens beyond their immediate family (Uslaner and 
Badescu, 2004b:13). When there is disbelief in state capacity to make the economic life 
better, people do not want intrusion into their economic affairs. A possible attempt to 
legalize informality is difficult because of this high mistrust between state and society. The 
informality can only shrink “…if the individual understands the necessity of an 
infringement of personal freedom,…..declares his solidarity with society and perceives the 
benefits of the state as being sensible” (Schneider and Enste, 2002:183). 
However, there is another interpretation that is quite different from the one above. 
Informality is a way of life for countries where corruption is the norm. As long as people 
can get their fair share from such practices, nobody will be too harsh about others engaged 
in similar activities. Especially when the fish rots from the head, that is those institutions 
that are supposed to guide and regulate the economic activities of the citizens, are 
themselves prone to corruption, there is no way of blaming  the citizenry for being 
distrustful. They just adapt themselves into this web of favoritism. In the next section I will 
search for a design to find an answer this question. 
In short, I have two propositions to test in the ensuing analyses: The first proposition 
is that in those countries where there is widespread corruption, we expect to see large 
informal sector; e.g. there is a positive relationship between corruption and informality. The 
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second proposition is that in countries where there is widespread informality we do not 
automatically have low levels of trust in state as long as people get their fair share from this 
practice. In that sense low levels of trust in state institutions are not necessarily the 
determining indicators of low tax morale and large informal sector. There may be many 
factors behind low levels of confidence in state institutions and trying to link confidence 
with informality means stretching the trust literature too much. 
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CHAPTER 3:  METHODOLOGY 
 
 
I will adopt a cross-sectional mode of analysis using data from the period 1997 to 
2003 for a total of 55 countries. All variables used in my analyses are not available for all 
countries and for all years. Accordingly, I use different years for different variables. 
However, since the variables I use are more likely to remain more or less of similar values 
for the period of analysis I take this as a minor shortcoming given the data constraints. To 
test the validity of my claims, I will use the following variables: 
 
Confidence in legal system, police, government and civil service will be used to 
calculate the overall trust in state institutions. Variables such as GNP per capita, 
Employment Laws Index, Cost to Register a Business, Bureaucratic Quality Index, Overall 
fiscal burden and Property Rights Index are control variables that I included into the 
equation to overcome biasedness. The only determinants of informal sector are not 
corruption and confidence, there has to be certain macroeconomic and policy-wise 
determinants that we equally have to account for.  It has usually been stated by economists 
that bureucratic regulations such as tax rates, employment laws, bureucratic obstacles 
during registering a business, the protection of private property (patents, royalties included) 
and overall bureucratic quality are equally important in the determination of the size of 
informality. In this work, I will try to find out which one(s) of these variables turn out to be 
more important and determining.  
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Table 1:  The List of Variables 
Variable Name Source Year Notes 
Size of Informal Sector   The work of Friedrich Schneider titled “Size 
and Measurement of the Informal Economy in 
110 Countries Around the World” a July 2002 
working paper  available at 
www.worldbank.org 
  
2000 
Calculated as a percentage of GNP. For the methodology, see the source 
cited. 
Corruption Perceptions 
Index 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) of 
Transparency International available at 
www.transparency.org 
2003 Countries are ranked according to the perceived levels of corruption 
calculated by independent (non-governmental) organizations. The index 
varies between 1 and 10. 10 means absence of corruption whereas 1 marks 
its total  prevalence. 
Confidence in legal 
system  (as a % of total 
population) 
World Values Survey downloaded from 
www.worldvaluessurvey.org 
1997 Question No: 137 of World Values Survey is “Do you have confidence in 
the legal system of your country? 1. great deal 2.quite a lot 3.not very much 
4.none at all.” I took the total  percentage shares of items 1 and 2 as an 
indicator of confidence 
Confidence in police  
(as a % of total 
population) 
World Values Survey  downloaded from 
www.worldvaluessurvey.org 
1997 Question No: 141 of World Values Survey is “Do you have confidence in 
the police of your country? 1. great deal 2.quite a lot 3.not very much 4.none 
at all.” I took the total percentage shares of items 1 and 2 as an indicator of 
confidence 
Confidence in 
government  (as a % of 
total population) 
World Values Survey downloaded from 
www.worldvaluessurvey.org 
1997 Question No: 142 of World Values Survey is “Do you have confidence in 
the government of your country? 1. great deal 2.quite a lot 3.not very much 
4.none at all.” I took the total  percentage shares of items 1 and 2 as an 
indicator of confidence 
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Variable Name Source Year Notes 
GNP per capita in 
$ (PPP) 
Downloaded from www.nationmaster.com, the real source is CIA 
World Fact Book 
2003  
 
Employment Laws 
Index (0=less 
rigid, 100=very 
rigid) 
World Development Indicators. The original methodology and 
data come from The Regulation of Labor, by Juan Botero, Simeon 
Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Sila at 
www.worldbank.org 
2003 This statistic is an average of ""Regulation - Hiring"", 
""Regulation - Firing"", and ""Regulation - Employment 
Conditions"". Nations are listed with an Employment Laws 
Index between 1 and 100. The higher the index, the more the 
nation regulates Employment 
Cost to register a 
business (% of 
GNI per capita)  
World Development Indicators and World Bank, Doing Business 
project (http://rru.worldbank.org/DoingBusiness/)  
2003 “Costs to register a business” is normalized by presenting it as 
a percentage of gross national income (GNI) per capita. 
Bureaucratic 
quality index 
International Country Guide of Political Risk Analysis Group at 
www.prsgroup.com  
2003 An index between 1 and 4 where higher scores are given to 
countries where the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise 
to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in 
government services. Bureaucracy tends to be autonomous 
from political pressure and has an established mechanism for 
recruitment and training. 
Overall fiscal 
burden index 
Index of Freedom of Heritage Foundation at  www.heritage.org  2004 An index between 1 and 5 where lower scores mean less tax 
burden on corporations and individuals. This index is a 
weighted average of scores for top marginal income tax rate 
(weight=25%), top marginal corporate tax rate (weight=50%) 
and change in government expenditure as a % of GNP 
(weight=25%) 
Property rights 
index 
Index of Freedom of Heritage Foundation at www.heritage.org  2004 An index between 1 and 5, where lower scores mean a higher 
respect for property rights. This factor scores the degree to 
which a country’s laws protect private property rights and the 
degree to which its government enforces those laws. 
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In testing the effect of the selected independent variables on the size of informal 
sector, a  multiple regression model will be utilized. This model will be constructed in a 
step by step fashion however I do not use a stepwise regression specification. First 
macroeconomic and fiscal policy determinants will be put into the equation. After assessing 
their explanatory capacity, the major trust indicators will be added to the model . Lastly 
those countries whose informal sector size is hard to estimate with the regression equation  
i.e.outliers will be excluded so as to get a better explanatory capacity with the regression 
equation at hand. It is true that with the inclusion of every new independent variable the 
number of countries for which the relevant data exist will decrease. This is mainly due to 
the fact that many of the indicators of the above table come from different sources 
calculated  for differing number of countries. At the start of the analysis my equation has 55 
observations. However, at the end of this step by step expansion of the model the number 
of observations drops down to 36. 
 
Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables  
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Size of Informal Sector (% of GNP) 55 8,8 67,3 29,99 14,48 
Corruption Perceptions Index 55 1,2 10 4,91 2,5 
Bureaucratic Quality Index 51 1 4 2,77 1,04 
Overall fiscal burden 55 1,8 4,4 3,49 0,68 
Property rights index 55 1 5 2,69 1,23 
GNP per capita in $ (PPP) 55 840 35991 13908,62 10481,97 
Confidence in Legal System 53 14,4 85,9 51,45 15,9 
Confidence in Police 53 12 89,2 53,39 20,17 
Confidence in Government 47 12 93,7 47,56 17,07 
Confidence in Civil Service 47 7,9 96,8 47,34 16,02 
Employment Laws Index 54 22 79 52,98 14,33 
Cost to Register a Business (% of 
GNI per capita) 54 0 112 21,96 23,06 
Valid N (listwise) 36     
 
 
Here it will be useful to make a more substansive description of the properties of our 
independent variables. 
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1.  Size of Informal Sector 
 
 
 
As it is shown in Table 1, the mean value for the size of informal sector as a percent 
of GNP is approximately 30 percent. The lowest informal sector size belongs to USA with 
a 8,8 percent and the highest informal sector size belongs to Georgia with 67,3 percent.  
 
Figure 1: Histogram of Size of Informal Sector 
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For an illustration of the variation in the informal sector size, some of the countries 
for the intervals of 0-15 %, 25-35 % and 50-70 % are plotted on the diagram. As can be 
observed from the histogram, informal sector size smaller than 10 % and bigger than 60 % 
are rare cases, however as the histogram is right skewed, it is harder to observe informal 
sector size for values bigger than 60%. The majority of the cases gather around the interval 
15 % and 35 % which covers 36 countries out of 55 observations. Nevertheless, there is 
still too much dispersion in the data since standard deviation is half the size of the mean 
value. There is the possibility of coming across countries with 15 % of GNP and 45 % of 
GNP within one standard deviation from the mean. The interesting fact about the 
distribution of informal sector size is that the smallest informal sector size belongs to 
Nigeria,Georgia 
Azerbaijan, 
Ukraine,Peru 
Uruguay 
 
Holland,UK, 
Switzerland, 
Australia,U.S.A,
Austria 
Turkey, 
Romania  
Croatia 
Colombia 
Pakistan 
Venezuela 
Bulgaria 
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OECD countries whereas largest informal sector size is observed in post-communist 
countries such as Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan which still struggle to establish a stable 
and strong state with clear frontiers. This means that informality is more likely to exist in 
countries where the sovereignty of the state and the rule of law are not instituted in the real 
meaning of the term. In that sense, state sovereignty and a stable political regime seem to 
be the prerequisites for a healthy functioning, rule-abiding economy. 
 
 
 
2. Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) Score 
 
 
 
As had been explained before, CPI score has a range between 1 and 10, the higher the 
score the less corrupt a society is. Only Finland achieved 10, in 2003 CPI rankings.  
 
Figure 2: Histogram of CPI score 
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In our survey, the mean value is approximately 5, which is a moderate score 
(meaning that it indicates neither too much corruption nor much transparency) but if one 
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looks at the distribution of the scores the number of countries above the average score 
(which is 5) is 21, while the ones below the average is 32, which means more corrupt 
societies dominate our observations. For a better illustration, I put sample countries for CPI 
score intervals 0-2 and 2,5-4,5 and 9-10. The 0-2 and 9-10 intervals are outliers, while 2,5- 
4,5 interval is the most populous, which again confirms that more corrupt societies are 
dominant in my sample.  
 
Although the values are mainly lower than 5, there is still significant dispersion in the 
dataset to claim any homogeneity across countries. Standard deviation is half the size of the 
mean and within one standard deviation there are both very low and very high CPI scores. 
What strikes the attention is the crowding of the lowest values of CPI index by post-
communist countries and some developing countries. The highest values are achieved by 
Northern European countries (Scandinavian countries mainly).   
 
 
 
3. Bureaucratic Quality Index 
 
 
 
Bureaucratic quality ranges between 0 and 4. Achieving a higher score in the 
bureaucratic quality index implies a more efficient administration. The mean value of my 
sample is 2,8 which is above an average performance ( I take the middle value 2, as 
average). Those countries that achieved 1, 2 and 4 are plotted on the histogram for 
observation. Notice that those countries that achieved 1 are outliers. There are only 7 
countries with the score of 1. Notice that many of the top ranking bureaucracies are OECD 
or developed countries, while poor performers are developing and post-communist. It is not 
surprising that those countries that achieved low levels of corruption and informality are 
also the ones with a better bureaucratic quality.  
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Figure 3: Histogram of Bureaucratic Quality Index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If one remembers the proposition that lower levels of corruption is only possible with a 
healthy functioning bureaucracy (look at page 16), it will not be hard to predict why the 
same countries appear for the lowest values in informal sector size and corruption levels 
and high bureaucratic quality. Only an impartial bureaucracy can manage with corruption 
and tax evasion and only in this way the informality can be kept at a minimum. 
 
 
 
4. Overall Fiscal Burden Index 
 
 
 
The overall tax burden index is within the range of 1 to 5, where higher scores mean 
higher tax burden.  
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Figure 4: Histogram of Overall Fiscal Burden 
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There is an observable trend in the overall fiscal burden data. There may be 
developing countries whose overall tax burden is comparable to that of developed 
countries, but usually the top tax rates, hence overall tax burden are higher for advanced 
economies of the world. The lower the tax burden, the lower the economic potential of the 
country. This fact is important in the sense that, it is usually claimed by economists that 
higher tax rates are responsible for larger informality, as firms and individuals can not cope 
with high tax rates, they opt for informality. Yet, the majority of high tax burden countries 
are OECD countries which also have the lowest informal sector size. This implies a new 
challenge to standard economic theory. The findings of the regression analysis will shed 
more light on this fact.  
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5. Employment Laws Index 
 
 
 
As explained before, the higher the employment laws index (from 0 to 100), the more 
rigid are the laws governing hiring, firing and employment conditions. The mean of this 
index turns out to be 53 (which is neither too rigid nor too lax). The majority of cases 
gather around values of 45-65. The countries with the most relaxed employment conditions 
are quite exceptional; only three countries exhibit such lax regulation. Notice that welfare 
states where employment conditions are considered as quite strict and protective do not 
rank as high as some of the developing countries on the right end of the distribution. Most 
of the developing world rank high on employment laws index. Notice that the developing 
world also ranks high on the size of informal sector. In that sense, the strictness of 
employment conditions can be an impediment on the growth of formal economy. 
 
Figure 5: Histogram of Employment Laws Index 
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6. Cost to Register a Business (as % of GNI per capita) 
 
 
 
For this indicator, there are countries varying between 0 (Denmark) to 112 (Ghana). 
We can still claim that cost to register a business is rather small for the sample we have at 
hand. The mean value is 22 and most of the values are one standard deviation below the 
mean which means much of the values center around 0-22 range. For an illustration, 
countries for the values 0-5 and 10-20 and 80-90 and 100-112 are put on the histogram. 
Notice that most of the developed countries are at the left hand-side, which means they 
have lower costs to register a business. There is a parallel between bureaucratic quality and 
cost to register a business. In countries where bureaucracy is qualified and efficient, 
entrepreneurs do not spend too much time, resource and energy in trying to deal with the 
red-tape, they are given the necessary aid by bureaucracy to increase their investments and 
research. In that sense in countries where there is high bureaucratic quality (mostly OECD 
countries) we can also observe lower costs to register a business. 
 
Figure 6: Histogram of Cost to Register a Business 
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7. GNP per capita in $ (PPP) 
 
 
 
The mean GNP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) is $13908 which is 
approximately equal to that of Hungary ($13339) The examples on the plot belong to 
smaller than $1000,  $1500-2500,  $ 5000-12500 and $ 22500-32500 ranges. The mean 
value is quite high due to the high GNP per capita levels in developed countries. If you 
look at the distribution of countries there are more low to medium income level countries 
than there are high income countries. This fact is even more evident if you take the value of 
standard deviation into account. Within one standard deviation   ($10481), we have very 
low income levels around $3000 to very high income levels around $24000.  
 
                  Figure 7: Histogram of GNP per capita in $ (PPP) 
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8.  Confidence in Legal System 
 
 
 
Histogram of Confidence in Legal System exhibits the percentage of people trusting their 
legal system across countries. Confidence in Legal System exhibits more or less a normal 
distribution where the values to the right and the left of the mean are almost equally 
distributed. The mean is 51 % of people having confidence in legal system 
 
Figure 8: Histogram of Confidence in Legal System 
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. Notice that the countries at the left extreme (around the values of 15 %) are low income 
countries with relatively big informal sector size. Nevertheless, we are not in a position to 
claim that higher level of confidence in legal system is a property of developed-high 
income countries. There as many developing countries, as there are developed countries to 
the right of the spectrum. (i.e. The most confident country is Ghana) The distribution and 
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trust in state institutions lowers informality. Many developing countries have high trust in 
their legal systems comparable to that of developed countries, yet they also have high 
informality. 
 
 
 
9. Confidence in Police 
 
 
 
The poorer countries tend to dominate lower levels of confidence in police in the 
histogram. The developed countries (mostly Scandinavian), on the other hand, dominate the 
right hand side of the histogram. The mean value is 53%, yet the values are highly 
dispersed. The value of standard deviation is nearly half of the mean value. There is not 
much skewness implying that countries with high or low levels of trust do not dominate the 
data set..  
 
Figure 9: Histogram of Confidence in Police 
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The findings of the confidence in police and confidence in legal system are somehow 
different. In the latter, there was not a clear link between the level of development and 
confidence. In this case however, developed countries show significantly higher levels of 
trust in police than the developing world. This may be due to the fact that, the primary 
public servants that people are mostly in contact with are the policemen. In that sense the 
attitudes about legal system may be shaped by very ambiguous criteria, while attitudes 
about police are much more solid and factual. In developing countries where grievances are 
more harshly suppressed than the more developed democratic world and where police is 
more prone to corruption due to economic scarcity, the negative perceptions about police as 
the chief symbol of  the legitimate violence of the state is more striking 
 
 
10. Confidence in Government 
 
 
 
The mean value for confidence in government is a below average value of 47 % (if 
one takes 50 % as average). In the case of confidence in government, higher levels of trust 
in government is not associated with a particular development level. There are wealthy, and 
relatively stable countries (without much macroeconomic crisis, and with better economic 
management) that are at the lower end of the spectrum i.e Japan, USA, Australia. By the 
same token, countries such as India, Bosnia and Philippines can rank as good as 
Switzerland and Norway and even better than Sweden, France or Austria, which proves that 
confidence is a relative term, from which many people may understand different things 
especially when they do not have the means to compare their country with other ones. In 
the case of confidence in government, economic well being is just one factor which is not 
the sole criteria to predict the levels of trust in state. 
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Figure 10:  Histogram of Confidence in Government 
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11. Confidence in Civil Service 
 
 
 
The observations we made about confidence in civil service are true for confidence in civil 
service. Higher levels of confidence in civl service is not associated with a particular 
development level. There are wealthy, and relatively stable countries with modern 
bureaucracies that are at the lower end of the spectrum i.e Japan, Finland and 
Australia,along with Romania or Colombia. By the same token, countries such as Bulgaria 
and Latvia classify as good as many Scandinivian countries, which again proves that 
confidence is a relative term, from which many people may understand different things 
especially when they do not have the means to compare their  country with other ones. 
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Figure 11: Histogram of Confidence in Civil Service 
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There are certain variables that should  be used to create new composite variables 
since they are the indicators of the same concept. There is also the danger of severe 
multicollinearity in the case of using these variables together that reduces their individual 
significance. Accordingly, CPI score and bureaucratic quality variables will be reduced into 
one composite variable called ‘bureaucratic impartiality’. The reason for the significance of 
multicollinearity is the following: A bureaucractic quality index is used to distinguish 
countries where the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic 
changes in policy or interruptions in government services. In those countries where 
bureaucracy tends to be autonomous from political pressure and has an established 
mechanism for recruitment and training one also expects to see less corruption. That is why 
there is a big correlation between these two variables. 
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Table 3:  Total Variance Explained With Factor Analysis for CPI score and 
Bureaucratic Quality 
 
 Communalities Factor Loadings % of Variance 
 Extraction  91,92 
CPI score 0,92 0,96  
Bureaucratic Quality 0,92 0,96  
New variable name: Bureaucratic impartiality 
 
92 % of the total variance in the two variables at hand can be explained by the new 
composite variable. The factor loadings for the two variables show that both variables are 
highly correlated with the newly created latent variable (96 %) that is called ‘bureaucratic 
impartiality’.  
 
I also put all the confidence variables into one factor variable since I want to explain 
trust in state institutions as a whole. 
 
Table 4:  Total Variance Explained With Factor Analysis for Confidence Indicators 
 
 Communalities Factor Loadings % of Variance 
 Extraction  67,42 
Confidence in Legal System 0,847 0,920  
Confidence in Police 0,475 0,684  
Confidence in Government 0,617 0,785  
Confidence in Civil Service 0,748 0,865  
New variable name: Confidence in public institutions 
 
The new composite variable explains 67 % of the total variance. The factor scores or 
the weights given to legal system, police, government and civil service are 92 %,68 %,78 & 
and 86 % respectively showing that all four variables are highly correlated with the newly 
created latent variable. 
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CHAPTER 4:  FINDINGS 
 
 
Here are the one to one relationship of informal sector with independent variables, on 
scatter plots. 
 
 
1.Size of Informal Sector and Corruption Level 
 
 
The size of informal sector is bigger for countries with higher levels of corruption. 
This is a finding that I have been emphasizing from the beginning. Informality cannot exist 
without the deliberate negligence of state officials, which is confirmed by the data at hand. 
 
Figure 12:  Size of Informal Sector and Corruption Level 
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Nevertheless, there are certain outliers in the data that do not fit the expected trend. 
Those countries that are significantly below the fit line such as China, Bangladesh, India 
and Slovakia exhibit lower levels of informality in comparison to their CPI score. 
Conversely, those countries above the fit line i.e. Uruguay, Belarus and Peru show higher 
levels of corruption in comparison to their informal sector size. In a similar vein, 
Scandinavian countries that achieved scores around 10 have higher informal sector size in 
comparison to their CPI score. Notice that the upper left corner of the fit line is crowded by 
developed countries (mostly OECD), while lower right corner is filled with developing and 
transition economies.  
 
 
 
2. Size of Informal Sector and GNP per Capita (PPP) 
 
 
 
 
There is an expected trend in the relationship between GNP per capita and 
informality. For those countries where GNP per capita is low, informal sector tends to get 
bigger. In those countries where GNP per capita is low poverty is a more acute problem and 
people endure worse working conditions for the sake of earning a living, which is a 
gateway to informality.  
There are certain outliers that have to be mentioned. Those countries that are well 
above the fit line such as USA, Norway, Belgium and Italy, have bigger informal sectors in 
comparison to their GNP per capita. Also notice that many of the developed countries are 
gathered around the upper left corner of the graph. Those outliers that are below the fit line 
such as China and India have smaller informal sectors than expected.  
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Figure 13: Size of Informal Sector and GNP per Capita (PPP) 
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3. Size of Informal Sector and Bureaucratic Quality Index     
 
 
 
Size of informality and bureaucratic quality are inversely proportional. Yet, at the 
same bureaucratic quality level, there is large variance of the size of informality for 
different countries. The other independent variables of the multiple regression equation will 
account for the difference in size of informality for the countries at the same bureaucratic 
quality level.  
There are certain outliers that I want to mention. Those countries above the fit line 
have higher levels of informality in comparison to the honesty of their bureaucracies i.e. 
Spain, Belgium, Peru and Philippines, whereas those below the line have lower levels of 
informality in comparison to the flaws in their administrative functioning. i.e China, 
Romania and Venezuela. Notice that all of the developed countries have low informality, 
high institutional capacity combination as the upper left corner of the line reveals. 
outliers 
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               Figure 14:  Size of Informal Sector and Bureaucratic Quality Index 
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4. Size of Informal Sector and Bureaucratic Impartiality   
 
 
The composite variable of Bureaucratic Impartiality derived from the factor analysis 
of CPI score and Bureaucratic Quality Index also has a very significant relationship with 
the size of informal sector. There is not much outlier except for China. It has a clear pattern. 
As bureaucratic impartiality increases informality shrinks. Notice that many of the OECD 
countries are above the fit line at the left hand side which implies they are at a low 
informality-high bureaucratic quality point.  
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                     Figure 15:  Size of Informal Sector and Bureaucratic Impartiality 
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5. Size of Informal Sector and Cost to Register a Business    
 
 
 
Cost to register a business is in direct proportion with the size of informality as it is 
revealed from the plot. The higher the costs of staying a formal business, the more will the 
enterprises opt for saying informal.  
 
There is not much outlier except for China. It has a clear pattern. As bureaucratic 
impartiality increases informality shrinks. Notice that many of the OECD countries are 
above the fit line at the left hand side which implies they are at a low informality-high 
bureaucratic quality point.  
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Figure 16:  Size of Informal Sector and Cost to Register a Business 
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Although much of the observations gather around the fit line, there are many outliers 
that have no consistent relationship with the remaining countries. In fact, if I excluded 
those outliers from the sample, the fit line would look quite flat, implying that there is not a 
very significant relationship between the cost to register a business and size of informal 
sector. 
 
In the following plots, there is no significant pattern in the relationship between size 
of informal sector and the independent variable. To be noted is the absence of any 
correlation between confidence in state institutions and informal sector size. I will return to 
this finding when I deal with the results of my multiple regression model. 
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6. Size of Informal Sector and Employment Laws Index 
 
Although there is a positive relationship between  employment  laws index (as the index 
increases, the regulation becomes more rigid, working conditions more under scrutiny) and 
informality. Both increase in the same direction. Yet, there is too much variation in the data 
to claim a perfect fit. The outliers -especially below the fit line - put limits to claims about a 
strong correlation. 
Figure 17:  Size of Informal Sector and Employment Laws Index 
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7. Size of Informal Sector and Confidence in Legal System 
 
There is a slight negative correlation between informality and confidence in legal 
system.  The correlation is slight because there is too much dispersion in the data. For the 
same value of informal sector size, the countries below the fit line have lower levels of trust 
in legal system, while for those above the levels of trust in legal institutions are higher than 
expected. While most of the developing countries show a mixed result in terms of 
confidence in legal system, ( if one looks below and above the line, in every corner there is 
a possibility to find a developing country), except for USA, Australia and Italy, many of the 
developed countries are either close to the fit line or above the line. 
Figure 18:  Size of Informal Sector and Confidence in Legal System 
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8. Size of Informal Sector and Confidence in Police 
 
There is a negative relationship between size of informal sector and confidence in 
police. Many developing countries are scattered around the fit line, either above or below, 
while almost all of the developed countries are above the upper left corner of the fit line, 
which means that developing countries show mixed results in terms of confidence in police, 
while developed countries have higher levels of trust. There are certain outliers i.e. 
Dominican Republic, Pakistan Argentina, Lithuania, Czech Republic and Slovakia, all well 
below the fit line which have lower levels of confidence in police in comparison to their 
informal sector size. 
Figure 19: Size of Informal Sector and Confidence in Police 
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Developed countries have 
relatively higher confidence 
in police in comparison to 
developing world. 
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9. Size of Informal Sector and Confidence in Government 
 
The correlation is rather awkward in this scatter plot. It seems as if the more there is 
confidence in government the bigger the informal sector. The data is too scattered and the 
slope is rather small to claim a powerful relationship. There are many outliers i.e. 
Dominican Republic, Bangladesh, Ghana and Azerbaijan that disprove the correlation. 
Figure 20:  Size of Informal Sector and Confidence in Government  
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10. Size of Informal Sector and Confidence in Civil Service  
 
As the confidence in civil service drops, the size of informality is getting smaller 
which is a finding unanticipated. Again, the data is very scattered with many outliers and 
the slope is rather small to claim a strong correlation. The developing and the developed 
The developed world shows mixed 
results in terms of  confidence in 
government. There are countries 
that are both above and below the 
fit line.  The same thing is true for 
developing countries as well. 
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countries show mixed results. I am not in a position to claim that high levels of trust in civil 
service and low levels of informality are a specific feature of developed countries. Despite 
the fact that developed countries are situated at the left hand-side, which means they have 
low levels of informality, trust in civil service is rather varying, they move below and 
above the fit line. Developing countries, on the other hand have both varying degrees of 
confidence and size of informality.  
Figure 21:  Size of Informal Sector and Confidence in Civil Service 
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11. Size of Informal Sector and Confidence in Public Institutions   
 
The direction of the correlation is as expected. As the confidence in public 
institutions decreases the informal sector size increases. Yet, the slope is too small to claim 
any powerful relationship. There is not a particular trend about confidence in public 
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institutions among the developed or the developing world. Despite the fact that developing 
countries have bigger informal sector size, their levels of confidence in public institutions 
are comparable to that of the developing world. This proves that confidence in public 
institutions does not result from overall economic performance or wealth creation. 
Figure 22: Size of Informal Sector and Confidence in Public Institutions   
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12. The Design of Multiple Regression 
 
 
 
The initial design of the regression equation included three dummy variables, based 
on the income groupings of the countries, namely high income group, upper income group, 
lower income group and low income group 14As the coefficient table reveals as the income 
level drops form high to upper income, size of informal sector increases by 13,1, as it drops 
                                                 
14
  The list of income groups is available as an appendix at the end of the chapter  
Despite the fact that many of the 
developing countries have poorer 
economic performance and worse living 
conditions, this does not seem to affect 
their confidence in state. They have (the 
region marked by 2) seem to be as 
confident as the developed (region 1) 
world.  But we also have to admit that at 
lower levels of  confidence in state, it is 
harder to find developed countries than it 
is to find developing ones. Below the fit 
line, we only have USA,Australia and 
Spain as low trusters, while we observe 
many developing countries. 
1 
2 
 62 
from upper to lower it increases by 9,08 (22,18-13,1), as it drops from lower to low it 
increases by 5,07 (27,11-22,18). This is consistent with the hypothesis that prevalence of 
informality is very much related to  and caused by low income and poverty. 
 
Table 5.Regression Equation According to Income Levels 
 
Dependent 
Variable:SIZEOFIS Unstd. Coefficients  Std. Coefficients t Sig. 
 
B Std. Error Beta 
  
(Constant) 17,22 2,23  7,73 0 
Upper Income 13,1 3,55 0,39 3,69 0 
Lower Income 22,18 3,55 0,66 6,25 0 
Low income 27,11 4 0,7 6,78 0 
 
 
R Square Adj. R Square F Std. Error of the Estimate 
0,55 0,53 21,06 9,96 
 
.
15The explanatory capacity of the dummies revealed by the Adjusted R square is 
0,53. Now I have to test the explanatory capacity of GNP per capita and decide on which 
variables to include into the equation. Since both GNP and income dummies test the levels 
of income, I will pick the indicator with the better explanatory capacity. 
 
Table 6.Regression Equation With GNP per capita substituted for Income Levels 
 
Dependent Variable: 
SIZEOFIS Unstd. Coefficients  Std. Coefficients t Sig. 
 
B Std. Error Beta 
  
(Constant) 44,48 2,16  20,57 0 
GNPPER -0,00104 0 -0,75 -8,37 0 
 
R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate F 
0,57 0,56 9,59 69,98 
 
 
The explanatory capacity of GNP per capita is higher than the dummies as revealed 
by the adjusted r square. So I take GNP per capita as our initial independent variable. Now 
I include the other macroeconomic variables at hand. 
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Table 7.Regression Equation With Major Macroeconomic and Fiscal Policy 
Determinants 
 
Dependent Variable: SIZEOFIS Unstd. Coefficients  
Std. 
Coefficients t Sig. 
 B Std. Error Beta   
(Constant) 33,3 11,14  2,99 0,01 
GNP per capita -0,00004 0 -0,04 -0,15 0,88 
Overall Fiscal Burden -3,32 1,97 -0,16 -1,69 0,1 
Property Rights Index -0,71 2,56 -0,06 -0,28 0,78 
Employment Laws Index 0,15 0,1 0,15 1,41 0,17 
Cost to Register a Business 0,11 0,07 0,19 1,62 0,11 
   Bureaucratic Impartiality -8,67 3,09 -0,63 -2,8 0,01 
 
R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate F 
0,7 0,66 8,1 16,74 
 
Adjusted R square increased significantly with the inclusion of the new variables 
(form 0,56 to 0,66).  Yet, the only significant variable is bureaucratic impartiality. Now I 
include the confidence indicators. 
 
Table 8.Regression Equation With the Inclusion of Confidence in Public Institutions 
 
a Dependent 
Variable: SIZEOFIS Unstd.Coefficients  
Std. 
Coefficients t Sig. 
 B Std. Error Beta   
(Constant) 29,76 13,09  2,27 0,03 
GNP per capita 0,00 0 0,04 0,16 0,88 
Overall Fiscal 
Burden -3,39 2,52 -0,16 -1,34 0,19 
Property Rights 
Index  -0,08 2,87 -0,01 -0,03 0,98 
Employment Laws 
Index 0,18 0,15 0,18 1,15 0,26 
Cost to Register a 
Business 0,12 0,1 0,21 1,27 0,21 
CPIscore & 
bureaucratic quality -9,31 3,92 -0,66 -2,37 0,03 
Confidence in 
Public Institutions -0,52 1,94 -0,03 -0,27 0,79 
 
R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate F 
0,74 0,67 8,2 11,15 
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As a last step I exclude the outliers which are two standard deviatians away from the 
estimates of our regression line. The descriptives of the outliers are given below, along with 
the final regression equation. 
 
Table 9.The Descriptives of the Outliers 
 
Case Number COUNTRY Std. Residual SIZEOFIS Predicted Value Residual 
24 Peru 2,4 59,9 40,24 19,66 
51 Uruguay 2,13 51,1 33,6 17,5 
 
Table 10.The Last Regression 
 
Dependent Variable: 
SIZEOFIS 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients  
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
 B Std. Error Beta   
(Constant) 20,87 10,22  2,04 0,05 
GNP per capita 0,00 0 0,3 1,27 0,22 
Overall fiscal 
burden -3,33 1,88 -0,17 -1,77 0,09 
Property Rights 
Index 0,12 2,24 0,01 0,05 0,96 
Employment Laws 
Index 0,25 0,12 0,26 2,12 0,04 
Cost to Register a 
Business 0,05 0,07 0,1 0,75 0,46 
CPIscore & 
bureaucratic Quality -12,25 3,03 -0,94 -4,04 0 
Confidence in 
Public Institutions 2,61 1,58 0,18 1,66 0,11 
 
R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate F 
0,84 0,79 6,1 19,16 
 
For values of  p=0,10 Overall fiscal burden (Sig=0,09), Employment Laws Index 
(Sig=0,04), and CPI score & Bureaucratic Quality (Sig=0) are the significant variables that 
have a meaningful effect on the size of the informal sector. The overall explanatory 
capacity of the model is  79 % .  
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Table  11.Residuals for the Estimated Regression Line  
COUNTRY 
Actual 
value (Size of 
Informal Sector) 
Predicted 
Value Residual 
Residual 
% 
Finland 18,3 13,56 4,74 0,35 
Sweden 19,1 10,88 8,22 0,76 
Canada 16,4 13,92 2,48 0,18 
Norway 19,1 15,69 3,41 0,22 
Switzerland 8,8 16,3 -7,5 -0,46 
Australia 15,3 10,1 5,2 0,52 
USA 8,8 11,51 -2,71 -0,24 
Chile 19,8 21,59 -1,79 -0,08 
Spain 22,6 20,69 1,91 0,09 
Japan 11,3 17,47 -6,17 -0,35 
Slovenia 27,1 27,4 -0,3 -0,01 
South Africa 28,4 29,65 -1,25 -0,04 
Czech Republic 19,1 22,3 -3,2 -0,14 
Lithuania 30,3 34,24 -3,94 -0,12 
Poland 27,6 28,4 -0,8 -0,03 
Brazil 39,8 43,89 -4,09 -0,09 
Turkey 32,1 36,85 -4,75 -0,13 
Croatia 33,4 34,79 -1,39 -0,04 
Argentina 25,4 26,58 -1,18 -0,04 
Bulgaria 36,9 40,56 -3,66 -0,09 
Ghana 38,4 39,11 -0,71 -0,02 
Latvia 39,9 36,2 3,7 0,1 
Mexico 30,1 32,59 -2,49 -0,08 
Colombia 39,1 33,4 5,7 0,17 
India 23,1 33,7 -10,6 -0,31 
Philippines 43,4 34,22 9,18 0,27 
Venezuela 33,6 42,11 -8,51 -0,2 
Moldova 45,1 42,81 2,29 0,05 
Armenia 46,3 44,59 1,71 0,04 
Russia 46,1 48,39 -2,29 -0,05 
Azerbaijan 60,6 49,49 11,11 0,22 
Ukraine 52,2 48,94 3,26 0,07 
Nigeria 57,9 46,73 11,17 0,24 
Bangladesh 35,6 42,34 -6,74 -0,16 
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The residual statistics exhibit few outliers at both extremes i.e.Switzerland and India, 
on the minus side, Sweden and Australia on the plus side. Many of the countries gather 
around the residual interval -0.13 % to 0.13 %. There is more of overestimation, since the 
countries to the left of 0 are more crowded. 
 
 
Figure 23.Histogram of Residuals (in %) 
RESIDUAL
,75
,63
,50
,38
,25
,13
0,00
-,13
-,25
-,38
-,50
10
8
6
4
2
0
Std. Dev = ,24  
Mean = ,02
N = 34,00
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
India 
USA 
Bangladesh 
Sweden Australia 
Finland 
Japan 
Philippines 
Canada 
Norway 
Colombia 
Azerbaijan 
Nigeria 
Spain 
Latvia 
Moldova 
Armenia 
Ukraine 
Chile 
Slovenia 
South Africa 
Czech Repub. 
Lithuania 
Poland 
Brazil 
Turkey 
Croatia 
Argentina 
Bulgaria 
Ghana 
Mexico 
Venezuela 
Russia 
Switzerland 
 67 
Figure  24.Multiple Regression Line of Informal Sector 
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The major derivation that can be made from these results is that, the composite 
variable of CPI score and bureaucratic quality (bureuacratic impartiality) is the single most 
important determinant of the size of informality. In places where there is a competent 
bureaucracy with efficiently functioning rules and impersonal service delivery and 
uncorruptible punishment mechanisms, informal sector is smaller. This finding is even 
more important when we take the sign of overall fiscal burden into consideration. The 
finding that as the overall fiscal burden gets bigger, the informal sector gets smaller may 
seem a little bit contradictory at the first instance. Yet, this finding has also been confirmed 
in other studies. In a similar study Johnson, Kaufman and Zordo-Lobaton (1998) also found 
out that countries that have higher income and corporate marginal tax rates and a higher 
share of tax revenues in GDP have lower unofficial economies. Best tax rates (lowest) are 
in seemingly unlikely places such as Bolivia and Uruguay which also have big informal 
sector.  This means the perceptions about the  tax burden  are not a mere function of tax 
rates but rather a function of the way the tax administration is carried out. The findings of 
the regression equation are very much supportive of this argument. It is no coincidence that 
“overall fiscal burden” and “bureaucratic impartiality” are significant at the same time. This 
indicates that while higher tax rates increase overall tax burden, an efficient public finance 
Countries above the 
regression fit line are more 
populous than countries 
below the fit line, which 
confirms the fact that there is 
more of overestimation 
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(hence a well functioning bureaucracy) highly compensates this adversity, by the better 
provision of public goods thanks to higher share of tax revenues in GNP.  
 
One should be careful in defining the tax burden as evaluated by the firms. Here, I 
used official marginal tax rates as variables. It is interesting to note that higher marginal 
income tax rates in an honest and non-arbitrary bureaucracy may result in less tax burden 
on the firm than lower statutory tax rates in a corrupt administration (Johnson, Kaufman 
and Zordo-Lobaton, 1998:23). The levels of tax rates in themselves do not cause the 
politicization of the economy which forces firms underground. Much more depends on how 
taxation and regulation is administered and implemented. 
Employment Laws Index, is another variable that turns out to be significant. In 
places, where practices of hiring, firing and employment conditions are too strict, firms opt 
for informality. 
The more corrupt a society is, the bigger the informal sector, that is for sure. But 
when we come to the link between confidence in state institutions and informality, the 
relation is rather unexpected. The relation turns out to be positive, where confidence in state 
institutions increases, informality also increases. Yet, as the p value is insignificant, it 
seems there is no direct relation between people’s recalcitrant attitude about paying taxes, 
or playing by the rules of the game with their trust in state institutions. It may very well be 
the case that they do not even consider their illegal behaviour as malfaisance or breaching 
citizenship obligations. If one remembers the inclusive aspects of corruption in a society, 
one understands the prevalence of informality better. In many developing nations, it is quite 
legitimate to make gift payments to officials, to use official positions to obtain jobs for 
relatives or to give a private fee to tax collectors for ignoring the informal business. As long 
as the citizens are able to get their share from this immoral practice, the damaging affects of 
corruption on the political psychology of citizens is not as big as it might be expected. If 
corruption in a society is characterized by ease of joining, if it is inclusive, it will have an 
integrative force and its illegitimacy will not be questioned. Informality in that sense falls 
into integrative and inclusive form of corruption, due to its inclusive and integrative nature-
as it draws buyers and sellers into networks of mutual self-interest- it can become quite 
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large and pervasive. It could very well be the case that people consider such informal 
practices as normal and beneficial for the society and they may see no reason in 
condemning it. That is why; informality has not much to do with trust in state. It is rather a 
way of life in countries where bureaucracies are corrupt and personal, relationships go 
along with principles of favor and reciprocity and people perfectly adapt themselves into 
this web of administrative corruption. 
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CHAPTER 5:   CONCLUSION 
 
 
This study had its starting point in two competing hypothesis. Is informality due to 
low levels of trust in state, or is it a side-effect of wide-spread corruption and bureaucratic 
laxness?   
One interpretation is that informality is a reaction to state intrusion in economic 
affairs due to low levels of solidarity. Large informal economy is a sign that people have 
little faith in the government's ability to manage the economy and little faith in other 
citizens beyond their immediate family. When there is disbelief in state capacity to make 
the economic life better, people do not want intrusion into their economic affairs. A 
possible attempt to legalize informality is difficult because of this high mistrust between 
state and society.  
 
Another interpretation is that informality is a way of life for countries where 
corruption is the norm. As long as people can get their fair share from such practices, 
nobody will be too harsh about others engaged in similar activities. Especially when the 
fish rots from the head, that is those institutions that are supposed to guide and regulate the 
economic activities of the citizens, are themselves prone to corruption, there is no way of 
blaming  the citizenry for being distrustful. They just adapt themselves into this web of 
administrative corruption.  
 
The findings of my analyses are very much supportive of the second argument. There 
is no way to claim that low level of confidence in state institutions is specific to 
mismanaged, corrupt societies with high levels of informality. There may even be an 
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expectation on the part of informal players that state institutions will be supportive of their 
illegal practices i.e expecting legal protection to unauthorized shantytowns. The way to 
fight with informality is not to change the perceptions of people, but to change the way 
state policies are carried out. With an impersonal, efficient and determined bureaucracy, it 
will not take long to prove that the state plays according to the rules of the game and expect 
the citizens to do the same. There may arise some frictions between the state and society on 
the way of achieving this new equilibrium but there seems to be no better alternative.  
 
This study had many limitations. The years of observation for many of the data 
sources were different. This was a minor distraction since many of the indexes and 
variables used in this analysis remain stable for many years and countries more or less 
show the same performance for a long period of time. Second limitation was the limited 
number of observations in the final regression line due to the mismatch of countries each 
index contained. Another difficulty was about the nature of the confidence questions. The 
macroeconomic indicators were all objective and country-wise. Confidence, on the other 
hand, is something very much related to personal characteristics as well as unique 
experiences. I rationalize this case, by referring to those personal experiences with various 
state institutions as reflecting something meaningful about the way political culture 
operates at the societal level. For example, there is no other way of trying to figure out the 
extent of corruption in society than asking people their own experience. People may lie 
about their own participation, but they will surely reveal many observations and useful 
insights about informality and corruption. 
 
As a last point, I should admit that a cross country study on informal sector could be 
more fruitful if the countries at hand could be divided into subcomponents such as 
developing, developed or transition countries. There should be more consistency in 
countries with the same levels of development. For instance, most of the OECD countries 
in our dataset showed approximately the same trend in terms of the relationship between 
informality and the independent variables. Yet, to decompose the work into subcomponents 
would be to decrease the number of observations into even smaller numbers which would 
put the results of this study under suspicion.  
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APPENDICES 
 
 
APPENDIX A.  
 
Countries Classified According to Their Income Levels (downloaded from 
www.nationmaster.com ) 
 
High 
Income Upper Income Lower Income 
Low 
income 
Finland Chile S.Africa Bosnia 
Denmark Uruguay Peru Bangladesh 
Sweden Venezuela Belarus Georgia 
Canada Mexico Turkey Pakistan 
Norway Latvia Bulgaria Nigeria 
Holland Slovakia Colombia Azerbaijan 
UK Argentina Chile Moldova 
Switzerland Croatia Romania India 
Australia Brazil Philippines Ghana 
USA Poland Armenia  
Austria Lithuania Russia  
Ireland Czech Republic Ukraine  
Spain Hungary Dominican Rep.  
France    
Japan    
Portugal    
Belgium    
Slovenia    
Italy    
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APPENDIX B. DATASET 
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Finland 18,3 10 4 3,5 1 25776 67,2 85,1 34,4 36,9 55 3 
Denmark 18,2 9,8 4 4 1 28842 79,4 89,2  51,4 25 0 
Sweden 19,1 9,4 4 4 1 25985 63,2 81,3 43,6 49,8 42 1 
Canada 16,4 9,2 4 2,8 1 29002 54,4 84,1 37,6 50,1 34 1 
Norway 19,1 9,1 4 4 1 32797 69,8 85,6 66,4 51,4 41 4 
Holland 13 8,9 4 4,4 1 27107 63,9 73,2  46 54 14 
United 
Kingdom 12,6 8,7 4 3,9 1 25426     28 1 
Switzerland 8,8 8,6 4 3,4 1 31891 66,8 69,5 54 49,2 36 9 
Australia 15,3 8,3 4 3,8 1 26631 35 75,6 26,4 38,2 36 2 
United States 8,8 7,8 4 4 1 35991 36,3 71,2 30,6 51,8 22 1 
Austria 10,2 7,7 4 4,3 1 27808 58,5 67,8 41,9  30 7 
Chile 19,8 7,4 3 2,6 1 9964 45,9 50 53,3 48 50 12 
Ireland 15,8 7,2 4 2,4 1 28974 47,1 85,7 59,4  49 10 
Spain 22,6 7 4 4,1 2 21152 49,1 63,1 33 44,7 70 19 
France 15,3 6,7 3 4,3 2 25888 57,6 66,5 49,1  50 3 
Japan 11,3 6,4 4 4,3 2 28699 79,6 78,7 30,3 36,6 37 11 
Portugal 22,6 6,4 3 3,8 2 19322 40,8 44,2  31,4 79 13 
Belgium 23,2 6,1 4 4,4 1 29127 44,6 51  42,5 48 11 
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Slovenia 27,1 5,5 3 3,5 3 19145 35,9 47,4 40,6 28,9 59 16 
Taiwan 19,6 5,5 3 3,3 2 17962 55,7 57,7 69,7 53,2   
Uruguay 51,1 5,5 2 3,5 2 7857 59,7 53,2 41,6 44,8 39 47 
Hungary 25,1 5,2 4 3 2 13339 59,6 50,5 49,6  54 64 
South Africa 28,4 5 2 3,9 3 10000 66,8 75,1 71,6 63,9 36 9 
Italy 27 4,6 2,5 4,1 2 25086 31,7 64,9 25,1  59 24 
Peru 59,9 4,4 2 3,3 4 4885 20,3 26,4 42,5 17,7 73 25 
Czech 
Republic 19,1 4,3 3 3,9 2 15328 45,6 34,2 48,4 33,6 36 12 
Belarus 48,1 4,1  3,4 4 8737 51,2 39,3 54,3 56,6 77 27 
Lithuania 30,3 4,1 2,5 2,4 3 8372 29,1 24,8 41,7 49,3 64 6 
Poland 27,6 4,1 3 3,6 3 9662 56,5 54,9 43,3 42,3 55 20 
Brazil 39,8 3,9 2 2,5 3 7559 55,1 45,7 49,1 59,5 78 12 
Turkey 32,1 3,8 2 3,9 3 7189 68,6 68,8 47,5 67,5 55 37 
Croatia 33,4 3,7 3 3,1 4 9750 58,4 66,3 59,5 42,7 65 18 
Argentina 25,4 3,5 3 3,8 4 10423 26,6 22,6 26,7 7,9 66 8 
Bulgaria 36,9 3,5 2 1,8 4 6530 43,4 54,1 62,5 54,6 53 8 
Ghana 38,4 3,5 2 4 3 2015 85,9 76,5 93,7 96,8 35 112 
Slovakia 18,9 3,5 3 2,9 3 12401 27,2 35 30,1  61 10 
Latvia 39,9 3,4 2,5 2,6 3 8936 40,3 32,7 39,8 46,6 62 15 
Mexico 30,1 3,3 3 4 3 8811 41,7 33,7 42,3 42,2 77 19 
Dominican 
Rep. 32,1 3,3  3,1 4 6170 14,4 12 12 9,1 49 48 
Bosnia 34,1 3,3  2,5 5 1830 69,4 78,7 69,3 54,9 49 52 
Colombia 39,1 3,2 2 4,3 4 6039 49,1 50,4 38,1 33,9 59 27 
China 13,1 3,1 2 4,4 4 4653     47 14 
Romania 34,4 2,9 1 3,1 4 7601 47,6 45,1  30,5 54 12 
India 23,1 2,8 3 3,6 3 2537 82 51,7 67,4 77,3 51 50 
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Philippines 43,4 2,8 3 3,5 4 4487 66,9 55,9 59,6 68 60 24 
Venezuela 33,6 2,7 1 4,3 4 5341 37,4 30,1 26,6 31,2 75 19 
Moldova 45,1 2,6 2 2,4 3 2592 50,6 34,2 45,2 58,1 67 26 
Armenia 46,3 2,5 1 2,3 3 3646 33,4 33 43,9 39,7 57 9 
Pakistan 36,8 2,5 2 4 4 1959 50,1 16,4  47,2 58 47 
Russia 46,1 2,1 1 2,6 4 9749 41,1 31,5 28,5 53,2 61 9 
Georgia 67,3 1,8  2,4 4 3252 41,7 34,4 46,3 48,3 55 26 
Azerbaijan 60,6 1,5 1 3,4 4 3653 49,4 46 92,8 51,4 63 17 
Ukraine 52,2 1,5 1 3,9 4 4536 47,4 41,1 47,8 51,3 73 27 
Bangladesh 35,6 1,3 2 4 4 1720 71,9 36,1 77,2 71,5 50 76 
Nigeria 57,9 1,2 1 3,5 4 840 55,8 47,6 41 63,3 43 92 
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APPENDIX C. COUNTRY ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
	
 /..$	 	
 /..$	 	
 /..$	 
Finland FN  Taiwan TAI  Mexico MEX  
Denmark DN  Uruguay URU Dominican Rep. DOM 
Sweden SW  Hungary HUN  Bosnia BOSNI 
Canada CN  South Africa SAFR  Colombia COL  
Norway NW  Italy IT  China CHI  
Holland HL  Peru PER  Romania ROM  
United Kingdom UK  Czech Republic CZE  India IND  
Switzerland SWI  Belarus BEL  Philippines PHIL  
Australia AUS  Lithuania LIT Venezuela VEN  
United States USA  Poland POL  Moldova MOL  
Austria Austria  Brazil BRA  Armenia ARM  
Chile CH  Turkey TR  Pakistan PAK 
Ireland IR  Croatia CRO  Russia RUS  
Spain ESP  Argentina ARG  Georgia GEO 
France FR  Bulgaria BUL  Azerbaijan AZER  
Japan JP  Ghana GHA  Ukraine UKR  
Portugal PR  Slovakia SLOVAK  Bangladesh BANG 
Belgium BEL  Latvia LAT  Nigeria NIG  
Slovenia SLO      
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